The Essence of Dispositional Essentialism

Yates, David

doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00568.x

Cited by 28 publications

(25 citation statements)

References 37 publications

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“…Most advocates of the powers ontology agree with one or both of the following: a. A power is an ontic property that has a dispositional essence (Swoyer 1982;Ellis and Lierse 1994;Shoemaker 1998;Bird 2007a;Ellis 2001;Bauer 2013;Yates 2013). 3 b.…”

Section: What Are Powers?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Overpowering: How the Powers Ontology Has Overreached Itself

Bird¹

2016

Mind

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Many authors have argued in favour of an ontology of properties as powers and it has been widely argued that this ontology allows us to address certain philosophical problems in novel and illuminating ways, for example causation, representation, intentionality, free will, and liberty. I argue that the ontology of powers, even if successful as an account of fundamental natural properties, does not provide the insight claimed as regards the aforementioned nonfundamental phenomena. I focus on and criticise the powers theory of causation presented by Mumford and Anjum (2011), and argue that related criticisms can be directed at other abuses of (the ontology of) powers.

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Section: What Are Powers?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Overpowering: How the Powers Ontology Has Overreached Itself

Bird¹

2016

Mind

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“…11 Molnar (2003); Bird (2016). 12 For more on the distinction between powers and dispositions, see Yates (2013).…”

Section: Principle (S)-structural Individuation-is In My View the Cormentioning

confidence: 99%

Inverse functionalism and the individuation of powers

Yates

2017

Synthese

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Let a basic physical property be any simple, unrealized property that features in the laws of ideal completed physics.1 Perhaps electric charge and mass-energy are such properties.Proponents of powers ontologies 2 think that at least some basic physical properties have at least partially causal or dispositional essences. Powers ontologies are motivated by problems with categoricalism, the view that basic physical properties have no non-trivial essential modal character. There are two main categoricalist positions on the relationship between properties and laws: the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis best systems theory (MRL), and the Dretske-TooleyArmstrong nomic necessitation theory (DTA), which can be characterised as reductionist and anti-reductionist, respectively. 3 According to MRL, laws of nature reduce by supervenience to local matters of contingent fact. Roughly, the laws of nature are the theorems of the deductive system with the best possible combination of simplicity and strength in relation to the totality of available evidence. 4 On Lewis' version of MRL, basic categorical properties derive their causal roles from the total pattern of instantiation of such properties throughout spacetime, upon which pattern the laws of nature supervene. On DTA, second-order lawmaking relations are introduced to explain why first-order universals have their causal profiles-Fs cause Gs in virtue of N(F,G). Laws are irreducible second-order governing relations, and confer causal roles upon intrinsically inert categorical properties. 1 The reason I use 'basic' rather than 'fundamental' will become clear in §3. I also use 'basic' to describe (putatively) non-composite physical particulars such as electrons and quarks. I likewise apply 'complex' to both properties and particulars.2 Shoemaker (1980); Ellis (2002);Heil (2003); Molnar (2003); Mumford (2004); Bird (2007a); Martin (2007). 3 For a canonical statement and defence of MRL, see Lewis (1994); for DTA see Armstrong (1983). 4 Lewis (1994), pp. 478-9. forthcoming in Synthese (Penultimate draft. See published version at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1417-9) 2 There are many well-rehearsed problems with these positions. Given that MRL laws supervene on local matters of fact, how can they also explain those matters of fact? How can the laws play a role in bringing about the particular events they subsume, if the laws themselves are metaphysically grounded in the total course of events? Is what counts as the best system in part dependent on the quirks of human psychology, and if so, is MRL inconsistent with the objectivity required by robust scientific realism? 5 If the N-relation in DTA's N(F,G) doesn't essentially ground the fact that Fs cause Gs, then don't we need a third-order N-relation to explain why it does at our world, which sets us off on a regress? Conversely, if we say that N(F,G) is essential to N, then N itself can't be categorical. 6 Finally, most versions of categoricalism, assuming in addition that categorical properties stand in primitive transworld ident...

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“…17 There is a further semantic reason (a Kripkean one) for accepting this principle: we extrapolate from the original condition in which the stimulus brought about the manifestation; this connection entails all the properties in which the conditional was formulated. Fara 2005, Molnar 2003, Manley and Wasserman 2011, McKitrick 2003, Yates 2013, Contessa 2013, and Cross 2011 for a review).…”

Section: Against Necessitarianism: the Test Of Antecedent Strengtheningmentioning

confidence: 99%

Necessitarianism and Dispositions

Gozzano

2020

Metaphysica

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In this paper, I argue in favor of necessitarianism, the view that dispositions, when stimulated, necessitate their manifestations. After introducing and clarifying what necessitarianism does and does not amount to, I provide reasons to support the view that dispositions once stimulated necessitate their manifestations according to the stimulating conditions and the relevant properties at stake. In this framework, I will propose a principle of causal relevance and some conditions for the possibility of interference that allow us to avoid the use of ceteris paribus clauses. I then defend necessitarianism from recent attacks raised by, among others, Mumford and Anjum, noting that the antecedent strengthening test is a test for causal relevance that raises no difficulties for necessitarianism.

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The Essence of Dispositional Essentialism

Cited by 28 publications

References 37 publications

Overpowering: How the Powers Ontology Has Overreached Itself

Overpowering: How the Powers Ontology Has Overreached Itself

Inverse functionalism and the individuation of powers

Necessitarianism and Dispositions

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