The Equilibrium Decisions in a Two-Echelon Supply Chain under Price and Service Competition

Han, Xiaonan; X, Sun; Zhou, Yancong

doi:10.3390/su6074339

Cited by 10 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…Wang et al [20] consider a problem of choosing an appropriate channel for the marketing channel structure of remanufactured fashion products. Han et al [21] incorporate both price competition and service competition into a supply chain model of a manufacturer and two competing retailers.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Investment Strategy of Emission-Reduction Technology in a Supply Chain

et al. 2015

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Greenhouse gas emissions have serious impacts on the natural environment. Therefore, the restrictions imposed on carbon emission force enterprises to take carbon emission into consideration when making production decisions. In this paper, in the context of allowing emission trading and investment of emission reduction technology, models were presented for a two-stage supply chain to analyze the optimal investment and pricing decisions. The results indicate that manufacturer's endurance capacity of reduction difficulty is higher in the cooperation model than in the Stackelberg game model, and that perfect coordination of supply chains can be realized by a revenue sharing contract. From the perspective of a consumer, low-carbon products mean higher price, so that subsidies or tax exemptions should be provided to keep low prices. Meanwhile, the government can promote investment in emission-reduction technologies and achieve its emission reduction targets by controlling emission trading price, strengthening emission reduction publicity and providing technology investment subsidies.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Investment Strategy of Emission-Reduction Technology in a Supply Chain

et al. 2015

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“…Similarly, the 3PL's profit in one cycle is equal to the total logistics revenue minus the sum of corresponding logistics and investment costs. Similar to Han et al [28], assuming the logistics investment cost coefficient is 2 when the logistics service level is , the 3PL's profit is…”

Section: Model Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 91%

Pricing and Ordering Decisions in a Retailer Dominant Channel Involving a Third‐Party Logistics Provider

Chen

Walker

et al. 2019

Complexity

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This paper theoretically investigates pricing and ordering decisions in a supply chain system comprised of a dominant retailer, a manufacturer, and a third-party logistics (3PL) provider. The paper introduces the logistics service level as an additional variable and obtains the equilibrium pricing and ordering decisions of the supply chain members by applying game theory. Our analysis focuses on the effects of three sensitivity coefficients, i.e., the retailer’s order quantity to the manufacturer’s wholesale price, the 3PL’s logistics service price, and the logistics service level on equilibrium decisions. In addition, we explore the effect of the logistics investment cost and the market risk on equilibrium decisions. Finally, we present a numerical illustration to validate our theoretical results and explore their effects on channel performance.

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“…Under price and service competition, the influence of retailer power is investigated and some competitive strategies for the retailer within an e-commerce environment are proposed. In the paper of Han et al [16], two competing retailers sell two substitutable products produced by one manufacturer and compete on price and service, while the manufacturer provides service. Indeed, price and service competition exists not only in the SC, but also between two supply chains.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Price and Service Competition in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain with Product Customization

Jian

Jiang

2021

Complexity

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This paper considers a dual-channel supply chain with product customization. One manufacturer and one retailer are involved. The online direct sales channel sells standard and customized products, and the offline retail channel sells standard products. The prices and service levels of products sold via different channels are differentiated, and the customization level which influences the customization cost and choices of customers is decided by the manufacturer. Three game models are proposed: the manufacturer Stackelberg (MS) model, the retailer Stackelberg (RS) model, and the Nash game model. The price and service decisions of the players are derived. Meanwhile, a service-cost-sharing contract is designed for the MS model. The impacts of price and service competition, service cost, and customers sensitivity to the customization level on the optimal decisions are investigated. Through the numerical analysis, we find that, among the three models, the manufacturer Stackelberg model is the most beneficial game structure for the overall supply chain but has the largest revenue gap between the two members. Second, under price competition and service competition, the manufacturer should differentiate the prices and services for direct sales standard products and customized products according to his market status. Third, the manufacturer should increase customization expenditures to construct his customization production line and provide more diversified products when consumers are more sensitive to product customization.

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The Equilibrium Decisions in a Two-Echelon Supply Chain under Price and Service Competition

Cited by 10 publications

References 14 publications

Investment Strategy of Emission-Reduction Technology in a Supply Chain

Investment Strategy of Emission-Reduction Technology in a Supply Chain

Pricing and Ordering Decisions in a Retailer Dominant Channel Involving a Third‐Party Logistics Provider

Price and Service Competition in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain with Product Customization

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