The emotion account of blame

Menges, Leonhard

doi:10.1007/s11098-016-0680-9

Cited by 23 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 30 publications

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“…For good overviews of the leading accounts of attention, see Christopher Mole (2017) and Sebastian Watzl (2017). 25 An especially nice description of this distinction is found in Leonhard Menges (2017).…”

Section: Thick Reactions and The Conflict Between Blame And Sympathymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Being Sympathetic to Bad‐History Wrongdoers

Agule

2021

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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For many philosophers, bad‐history wrongdoers are primarily interesting because of what their cases might tell us about the interaction of moral responsibility and history. However, philosophers focusing on blameworthiness have overlooked important questions about blame itself. These bad‐history cases are complicated because blame and sympathy are both fitting. When we are careful to consider the rich natures of those two reactions, we see that they conflict in several important ways. We should see bad‐history cases as cases about whether and how we should blame, rather than as cases giving us ready insight into the nature of moral responsibility.

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Section: Thick Reactions and The Conflict Between Blame And Sympathymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…24 24 An especially nice description of this distinction is found in Leonhard Menges (2017). …”

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confidence: 99%

Being Sympathetic to Bad‐History Wrongdoers

Agule

2021

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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“…3 This approach to moral blame is not without defenders. SeeWallace (2011) andMenges (2017) for very different defenses.4 Some may disagree and think negative emotional responses such as indignation and resentment are perfectly legitimate responses to people for their epistemic failings. The account of epistemic blame I develop below can accommodate this view.5 In Boult 2020, I discuss this alternative framework in the context of defending the very idea that there is a distinctively epistemic kind of blame.6 The account does not require that ordinary speakers have the explicit concept of an "epistemic norm violation."…”

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confidence: 99%

The significance of epistemic blame

Boult

2021

Erkenn

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One challenge in developing an account of the nature of epistemic blame is to explain what differentiates epistemic blame from mere negative epistemic evaluation. The challenge is to explain the difference, without invoking practices or behaviors that seem out of place in the epistemic domain. In this paper, I examine whether the most sophisticated recent account of the nature of epistemic blame-due to Jessica Brown-is up for the challenge. I argue that the account ultimately falls short, but does so in an instructive way. Drawing on the lessons learned, I put forward an alternative approach to the nature of epistemic blame. My account understands epistemic blame in terms of modifications to the intentions and expectations that comprise our "epistemic relationships" with one another. This approach has a number of attractions shared by Brown's account, but it can also explain the significance of epistemic blame.

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“…66 See, for example, Wallace (1994), Wolf (2011), and Menges (2017b). Note, however, that the arguments in the remainder of the paper are in principle compatible with every account of the nature of blame. …”

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Responsibility and appropriate blame: The no difference view

Menges

2020

European J of Philosophy

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How do the fact that an agent is morally responsible for a certain morally objectionable action and the fact that she is an appropriate target of blame for it relate to each other? Many authors inspired by Peter Strawson say that they necessarily co‐occur. Standard answers to the question of why they co‐occur say that the occurrence of one of the facts explains that the other obtains. This article presents a third option: that they are one and the same fact. There is no difference between the fact that a person is an appropriate target of blame for an objectionable action and the fact that she is morally responsible for it. This view has the advantage of being metaphysically more parsimonious and of answering, in an elegant and plausible way, an interesting question about which many standard theories of responsibility keep silent: what is it to be morally responsible simpliciter?

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The emotion account of blame

Cited by 23 publications

References 30 publications

Being Sympathetic to Bad‐History Wrongdoers

Being Sympathetic to Bad‐History Wrongdoers

The significance of epistemic blame

Responsibility and appropriate blame: The no difference view

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