The emergence of the entrepreneurial state in contemporary China

Duckett, Jane

doi:10.1080/09512749608719178

Cited by 47 publications

(25 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…As Jane Duckett (1996) stresses, Chinese local officials are not allowed to moonlight as formal employees of firms. Then how do the firms compensate these officials?…”

Section: Corruption As a Methods Of Compensationmentioning

confidence: 98%

Incentives and corruption in chinese economic reform

Fan

Grossman

2001

The Journal of Policy Reform

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This paper argues that, given the legacy of Chinese communism and its political structure, corruption, together with the threat of punishment for corruption and the selective enforcement of this threat, serves as a method of compensation that both satisfies the political objectives of the Communist Party and provides an effective inducement to local officials to promote economic reform.Incentives, Corruption, Economic Reform, China, Communist Party,

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“…As Jane Duckett (1996) stresses, Chinese local officials are not allowed to moonlight as formal employees of firms. Then how do the firms compensate these officials?…”

Section: Corruption As a Methods Of Compensationmentioning

confidence: 98%

Incentives and corruption in chinese economic reform

Fan

Grossman

2001

The Journal of Policy Reform

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“…33 E.g., Evans (1989); Blecher and Shue (2001). 34 Duckett (1996Duckett ( , 1998. 35 E.g., Evans (1995); Bremmer (2008Bremmer ( , 2009Lin (2008Lin ( , 2010; Mussacchio and Lazzarini (2012); Evans and Heller (2013).…”

Section: Analyzing Global Capitalismmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…31 Unger and Chan (1995); Witt and Redding (2013). 32 E.g., Oi (1992); Duckett (1996); Blecher and Shue (2001); McNally (2011). 33 E.g., Evans (1989); Blecher and Shue (2001).…”

Section: Analyzing Global Capitalismmentioning

confidence: 98%

Emerging varieties of incorporated capitalism. Theoretical considerations and empirical evidence

Buhr¹,

Frankenberger

2014

Bus. polit.

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The economic success of state-led forms of capitalism in Russia, China and some other autocracies is one of the most challenging developments for existing typologies of comparative political economy research. For the OECD-World complex theories and models assess the interrelation of polity and economy (e.g., Hall/Soskice), while well defined and systematic approaches for autocracies are seldomly found. Most of the existing work are rather idiosyncratic case studies. We argue that by climbing up the ladder of abstraction (Sartori), we gain analytical leverage and comparability between cases and regions. That's why we've developped an idealtype called "incorporated capitalism." By looking at statecapitalist developments in China, Singapore, Saudi-Arabia or Russia, there is strong empirical evidence for a variety of "incorporated capitalism": bureaucratic market economies and patrimonial market economies. Why are those types of capitalism so successful? In order to answer this question correctly, we have to consider other questions first: 1) Which are the specific patterns of interaction between polity and economy? 2) What are the unique governance mechanisms in those incorporated capitalisms? Using mainly qualitative methods we will empirically proof our theoretical findings in order to decode the special complementarities of the bureaucratic and patrimonial market economy in those four real types mentioned above.

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“…The first concept is 'entrepreneurial statehood' . This term, first used by Duckett (1996), depicts China's desire to have a capitalist market economy in which the state itself is not only a regulator but (through its soes) also an active partici pant (Gonzalez-Vicente 2011:404). The 'Going Out' strategy is a key element of this agenda.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Chinese National Oil Companies in Ghana: The Cases of cnooc and Sinopec

Hardus

2014

Perspect Global Dev Technol

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This article uses the case of Ghana to provide insight into the policies and strategies used by, as well as the cooperation between, Chinese state actors in their quest for natural resources in Africa. In 2007, Ghana discovered commercial quantities of oil. While the so-called Jubilee oilfield was initially divided amongst primarily Western oil companies, in 2010 the China National Offshore Oil Corporation partnered with Ghana’s national oil company to try and purchase a stake in Jubilee. Although this bid was rejected, later that year a second Chinese state-owned oil company, Sinopec, was able to access Ghana’s oil indirectly through an offtaker agreement, linked to a $3 billion dollar loan provided by the state-owned China Development Bank. The article uses these two cases to examine the level of coordination between the strategies of Chinese state actors in their attempts to access African natural resources. It shows that China’s national oil companies and policy banks operate in increasingly autonomous ways. This goes against the developmental state thesis, which argues that the Chinese state has full control over the overseas activities of its state actors. The article also shows that national political institutions in Africa can make use of and are able to influence Chinese resource deals, countering the notion of African passivity.

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The emergence of the entrepreneurial state in contemporary China

Cited by 47 publications

References 18 publications

Incentives and corruption in chinese economic reform

Incentives and corruption in chinese economic reform

Emerging varieties of incorporated capitalism. Theoretical considerations and empirical evidence

Chinese National Oil Companies in Ghana: The Cases of cnooc and Sinopec

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