Emerging varieties of incorporated capitalism. Theoretical considerations and empirical evidence

Abstract

The economic success of state-led forms of capitalism in Russia, China and some other autocracies is one of the most challenging developments for existing typologies of comparative political economy research. For the OECD-World complex theories and models assess the interrelation of polity and economy (e.g., Hall/Soskice), while well defined and systematic approaches for autocracies are seldomly found. Most of the existing work are rather idiosyncratic case studies. We argue that by climbing up the ladder of abstraction (Sartori), we gain analytical leverage and comparability between cases and regions. That's why we've developped an idealtype called "incorporated capitalism." By looking at statecapitalist developments in China, Singapore, Saudi-Arabia or Russia, there is strong empirical evidence for a variety of "incorporated capitalism": bureaucratic market economies and patrimonial market economies. Why are those types of capitalism so successful? In order to answer this question correctly, we have to consider other questions first: 1) Which are the specific patterns of interaction between polity and economy? 2) What are the unique governance mechanisms in those incorporated capitalisms? Using mainly qualitative methods we will empirically proof our theoretical findings in order to decode the special complementarities of the bureaucratic and patrimonial market economy in those four real types mentioned above.

Rising powers, global capitalism and liberal global governance: A historical materialist account of the BRICs challenge

“…The opening of BRICs’ capitalism to the world economy has not been accompanied by anything like a comparable degree of change in terms of the level of ‘coordination’ rather than liberalism in their domestic political economies. Several attempts have been made to conceptualize the distinctively non-liberal features of the BRICs’ political economies (Becker, 2013; Buhr and Frankenberger, 2013; McNally, 2012, 2013; May and Nölke, 2013b; Nölke, 2012; Ten Brink, 2010, 2011; Ten Brink and Nölke, 2013). While varying in their specifics, all acknowledge the heightened role of the state and non-market forms of coordination in the state–society relations of the BRICs states.…”

Comparative Capitalism, Growth Models and Emerging Markets: The Development of the Field

“…Beyond these ongoing debates about specific regional or subregional varieties of capitalism (for the African region see Nattrass 2014, Padayachee 2013, Nölke and Claar 2013, Nölke et al 2020 interregional comparisons have become prominent. Here, we can distinguish qualitative studies, focusing on the BRICS countries and other emerging economies (Ban and Blyth 2013, Becker 2013, Buhr and Frankenberger 2014a, Nölke et al 2015, Nölke et al 2020) from quantitative work based on cluster analyses (Buhr and Frankenberger 2014b, Rougier and Combarnous 2017, Witt et al 2018, Fainshmidt et al 2018. These efforts resulted in conceptualisations of varieties of capitalism in emerging economies that are valid beyond the scope of specific countries.…”

“…In Brazil, however, Western multinationals play an important role as they dominate sectors that usually are important for late industrialisation (electronics, car manufacturing and so on). 2 'Patrimonial capitalism' or patrimonial market economies (PMEs) constitutes another cross-regional variety of capitalism, particularly in Russia and the Arab region (Schlumberger 2008, Robinson 2011, Becker 2013, Buhr and Frankenberger 2014a, Becker and Vasileva 2017. This type is characterised by 'patron-client relations between political and economic elites, which deeply penetrate the social fabric' (Becker and Vasileva 2017, p. 86), leading to detrimental cronyism and rent-seeking.…”

“…a patrimonial type (PME)(Becker 2013, Buhr andFrankenberger 2014a), as depicted for the Arab world(Schlumberger 2008) as well as Russia and other former Soviet countries(Robinson 2011, Becker andVasileva 2017).…”

El estado desarrollista en el capitalismo chino: formación de vínculos entre agentes

“…), cuya dinámica se vería condicionada por la actuación de las instituciones, limitada a la vez por su trayectoria histórica (lo que se conoce como path dependence o dependencia del camino). Desarrollos posteriores (Boyer, 2005;Buhr y Frankenberger, 2014) dan mayor relevancia a distintos actores, como el Estado, que adquiere mayor importancia si se comporta como desarrollista, y dinámicas, como los conflictos estructurales internos y externos que afectan al modo en el que se produce la coordinación estratégica entre agentes (por ejemplo, afectando la capacidad del ED o contando con una estructura productiva atrasada y segmentada que dificulte el fomento de relaciones empresariales).…”