The Emergence of Global Companies in the High-Tech Industry of Defense: The Case of Indra in Spain, 1993-2007

Abstract

This article analyzes the intricacies of the creation and early evolution of a Spanish high-tech company in the defense sector -Indraand the involvement of diverse actors in the context of an increasing globalization. The study tests if the State worked as a shield behind which Indra withdrew as a shareholder and buyer or if market criteria were met. The text is structured in four main sections, which respond to the primordial stages of Indra. The first refers to the birth, the second to the restructuring, reorganization and consolidation of the company in the period 1993-1998 and the third to the subsequent growth, while the last deals with the internationalization, one of the distinguishing aspects of the period of Indra. The research is based on sources of diverse nature and provenance, mainly those of the company, as well as in newspaper archive material and in an extensive specialized bibliography. The study concludes that the keys to Indra's success lie in its commitment to investment, its restructuring and its external expansion, heavily backed by the State.

Cooperative innovation and crises: Foreign subsidiaries, state-owned enterprises, and domestic private firms

“…Unreported Bonferroni tests suggest that the sample SOEs are more likely than private firms, domestic or foreign, to cooperate with local research centres and universities and with local competitors (tables available upon request). Their relationships with universities are corroborated by case studies (Alonso-Gil and Vazquez-Barquero 2010;Calvo 2019;Rama and Ferguson 2007) and may be a result of the involvement of SOEs in basic research (Antonelli et al 2014;Landoni 2020). Both SOEs and universities are less concerned than are private firms with immediate market applications of innovation.…”

“…Evidence on Chinese SOEs remains inconclusive (Genin et al 2020;Liu et al 2017;Wang 2021). In contrast, Russian and Western European SOEs undoubtedly tend to engage in open innovation, cooperation for innovation included, with both domestic private firms and universities and, in the West, also with MNEs (Alonso-Gil and Vazquez-Barquero 2010; Antonelli et al 2014;Calvo 2019;Gershman et al 2018;L ó pez et al 2002;Rama and Ferguson 2007). In Landoni's (2020) view, SOEs may constitute vehicles to explore possible recombinations of knowledge due to their frequent networking with other organisations.…”

“…In contrast, the state preserved a certain degree of control ('golden shares') over profitable SOEs until 2004. One consistent line of action was the strengthening of inter-firm linkages through cross-shareholdings between firms (Arocena 2006;Calvo 2019;Cuervo-Cazurra 2018). Policies to preserve the nucleo duro (hard core) of stable shareholders were similar to those implemented in France under similar circumstances (Lazonick 2007).…”

“…Lazonick (2007: 24) opines that patient capital 'enables the capabilities that derive from collective learning to cumulate over time'. The empirical literature reports that Russian and Western European SOEs display continuity in their open innovation practices (Antonelli et al 2014;Calvo 2019;Gershman et al 2019;Rama and Ferguson 2007). However, little is known concerning the cooperative behaviour of SOEs when specifically faced with a crisis.…”

New challenges in European innovation partnerships. SOEs, POEs and foreign MNEs during crises

“…Inter-rm linkages were promoted through cross shareholdings between companies and often included large banks. (Arocena, 2006;Bulfone, 2019;Calvo, 2019;Cuervo-Cazurra, 2018). These types of social networks may have a positive impact on innovation by assisting companies in obtaining R&D funding (Cao et al, 2023).…”