The efficiency of share contracts in Ghana's cocoa industry

Boadu, Fred O.

doi:10.1080/00220389208422264

Cited by 17 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…However, they caution that working capital and wealth can be quite closely related, so their conclusion is not very strong on this. One study that detected that risk is correlated with sharecropping is by Boadu (1992) in Ghana, which found a higher frequency of sharecropping in areas with higher variability in cocoa yields.…”

Section: Theoretical Models and Empirical Evidencementioning

confidence: 99%

Distress rentals and the land rental market as a safety net: contract choice evidence from Tigray, Ethiopia

Gebregziabher

Holden

2011

Agricultural Economics

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Rural households in the semiarid Northern Ethiopian highlands are net buyers of food. Crop failure due to erratic and unpredictable rainfall occurs frequently and leads to food shortages and income shocks. The renting out of land may be one of the coping responses of households exposed to shocks.We developed a theoretical household model for poor landlord households capturing their contract choice response to downside production shocks. We tested econometrically whether contract choice may depend on poverty, capital constraints, production risk and random shocks. The multinomial logit model estimates show that poor households experiencing random shocks are more likely to choose fixed-rent contracts as a distress response to shocks, suggesting that fixed-rent contracts may be used to meet immediate needs, but at the expense of future incomes. We also found that fixed-rent contracts are preferred when ex ante production risk is low, while sharecropping is more likely where production risk is high. Finally, we found an indication that the choice of a fixed-rent contract as a coping response to shocks comes as a last resort after all other means of coping are exhausted

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Section: Theoretical Models and Empirical Evidencementioning

confidence: 99%

Distress rentals and the land rental market as a safety net: contract choice evidence from Tigray, Ethiopia

Gebregziabher

Holden

2011

Agricultural Economics

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“…Hill (1963) observed that the chiefs were glad to seize the opportunity of selling land outright to enterprising migrants. As uncultivated forestland has disappeared, renting land under share tenancy arrangements, called abusa (one-third of cocoa output for tenant) and abunu (50:50), have become major means for migrants to acquire access to land (Robertson 1982;Boadu 1992). In these tenancy contracts, tenants are requested to plant cocoa trees usually on bushland and manage cocoa trees until the whole field is planted to cocoa, at which time land ownership, rather than output, is usually divided between tenant and landowner (Asenso-Okyere, Atsu, and…”

Section: Figure 1-map Of Survey Area Ghanamentioning

confidence: 99%

Women’s Land Rights in the Transition to Individualized Ownership: Implications for Tree‐Resource Management in Western Ghana

Quisumbing

Payongayong²,

Aidoo

et al. 2001

Economic Development and Cultural Change

168

141

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“…Along this trend, agrarian contracts, and sharecropping more specifically, become a major focus of interest. However, studies dealing with sharecropping in sub-Saharan Africa remain few and far between (Charmes, 1975;Keegan, 1983;Robertson, 1987;Boadu, 1992;Lawry, 1993;Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001;Kassie and Holden, 2007;Bellemare, forthcoming). As more generally in studies regarding sharecropping in developing countries, they deal with the production of traditional crops.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

Sharecropping in Non-traditional Agro-export Production: The Abougnon Contract for Pineapple Cultivation in Côte d’Ivoire

Colin

2011

Eur J Dev Res

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This article highlights the role of sharecropping in small-scale, non-traditional export production, through the case of pineapple production in Coˆte d'Ivoire. The study reveals the diversity of contractual configurations with respect to the same crop, under the same local term of abougnon. Beyond a description of contractual practices, the article explores the rationale for share contracts in a context of imperfect tenancy, labour and credit markets. The analysis of actors' rationales in entering abougnon contracts points out the role of financing constraints and disequilibrium in the tenancy market. It highlights the secondary role played by transaction costs induced by moral hazard, incentives or -up to the crisis that struck down the sector -production and market risks. This in-depth, localised longitudinal case study relies on first-hand data collected through intensive fieldwork conducted in the village of Djimini-Koffikro in 1983and 2002-2003, updated in 2010 Cet article met en exergue le roˆle du me´tayage dans la production d'exportation non traditionnelle ap etite e´chelle, en s'appuyant sur le cas de la production d'ananas en Coˆte d'Ivoire. L'e´tude re´ve`le la diversite´des configurations contractuelles pour une meˆme culture et sous un meˆme terme local (abougnon). Au dela`d'une description des pratiques contractuelles, cet article examine la logique sous-tendant les contrats de me´tayage dans un contexte ou`les marche´s de location de terre, du travail et du cre´dit sont imparfaits. L'analyse des raisons pour lesquelles les acteurs passent des contrats d'abougnon met en e´vidence le roˆle des contraintes de financement et du de´se´quilibre du marche´locatif. Elle souligne le roˆle secondaire des couˆts de transactions induits par l'ale´a moral, des incitations ou -jusqu'a`la crise qui s'est abattue sur ce secteur -des risques de production et de marche´. Cette e´tude de cas longitudinale, approfondie et localise´e, s'appuie sur des donne´es de premie`re main recueillies graˆce a`un travail intensif de terrain effectue´dans le village de Djimini-

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The efficiency of share contracts in Ghana's cocoa industry

Cited by 17 publications

References 7 publications

Distress rentals and the land rental market as a safety net: contract choice evidence from Tigray, Ethiopia

Distress rentals and the land rental market as a safety net: contract choice evidence from Tigray, Ethiopia

Women’s Land Rights in the Transition to Individualized Ownership: Implications for Tree‐Resource Management in Western Ghana

Sharecropping in Non-traditional Agro-export Production: The Abougnon Contract for Pineapple Cultivation in Côte d’Ivoire

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