Conservation Banking in California is a long-established offset program. Banks are hybrid instruments that hover between market autonomy and regulatory oversight. Challenges that may affect program success include aligning regulation with the scales and objectives of the hybrid market and conservation and interaction with other compensation instruments. I use an analytical framework combining socialecological t (does the regulation t the spatial, functional, and temporal scales of the market or conservation?) and instrument interaction (are compensation instruments redundant, synergetic, etc.?) to analyze the institutional framework of the conservation banking program. Results show that the program fails to re ect the hybrid market or species conservation objectives, creating a social-ecological mismatch. The institutional framework disincentivizes banking, while its success in conserving species cannot be measured. Competing and redundant instruments can lead to weaker compensation. The program needs equal standards that re ect conservation objectives for all compensation instruments. Findings on t can be useful for other banking programs, and considerations on instrument interaction could improve offsets anywhere.