The Effects on Sick Leave of Changes in the Sickness Insurance System

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract: In order to get a more complete picture of how labor supply is affected by economic incentives, the effects on absenteeism and not just on contracted hours should be taken into account. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor mayIn particular, absenteeism due to sick leave can be considerable. In this paper we examine whether the level of sick leave compensation affects sick leave behavior. Using time-series data for Sweden spanning a long period with numerous changes of the compensation level, we generally find strong effects of the expected sign. Reforms implying more generous compensation for sick leave tend to be associated with permanent increases in total sick leave per person employed and vice versa. These findings are reinforced in a panel study covering the 1983-91 period.JEL Classification: H55, I38, J22.

The effect of health care expenditure on sickness absence

“…Henrekson and Persson, 2004) have found statistically signi…-cant e¤ects of current unemployment and labor force participation rates on absence. Here, national variations in these variables were captured by the year-speci…c …xed e¤ects, while time-invariant heterogeneity in these variables was wiped out by the …rst-di¤erence transformation.…”

“…During the study-period, the compensation levels in the mandatory and uniform national social insurance system ranged from 75 to 90 percent of the income from the second day of absence, but with a cap at a certain level of income. At …rst less than 10 percent of the insured were a¤ected by this cap, but by 2004 22 percent were (Henrekson and Persson, 2004; the Swedish Social Insurance Agency).…”

“…The literature also provides massive support for that economic incentives a¤ect absence, for example the following four studies using Swedish data; Johansson and Brännäs (1998); Palme (2002, 2005); Henrekson and Persson (2004). 3 Whether increased aggregated expenditure on health care actually improves the health status of the population in industrialized countries is still an open question.…”

The public health costs of job loss

“…Johansson andPalme (1996, 2005) study how changes in the income replacement level affect the incidence and duration of sick leave spells in Sweden (see also Henrekson and Persson (2004) for a related study). Askildsen et al (2005) argue that the negative relationship between unemployment and sickness insurance use may be due to worker moral hazard in a situation of full insurance against income loss.…”

Absenteeism and peer interaction effects: Evidence from an Italian Public Institute

“…( Barmby et al 1995, Johansson andPalme, 1996;Henrekson and Persson, 2004;Hassing and Koning, 2005). In addition, a number of empirical analyses shows that absence rates increase when monitoring costs increase.…”