The effects of representations and behavior in experimental games

Abstract

Many studies performed in the United States concerning behavior in experimental game situations, particularly the Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG), have shown that the response of a simulated partner appears to have slight effect on the pattern of the subject's cooperative responses. Deutsch (1958) and Minas, Scodel, Marlowe and Rawson (1960) demonstrated that subjects manifested a low level of cooperative response (28 % and 39 %, respectively) in the face of a systematically cooperative partner.

Market forces, negotiator frames and transaction outcomes

“…This implies that frarmng effects will differ as a result of contextual differences which create variations in the dynamics by which settlement is reached. Moreover, such an argument is consistent with research demonstrating that in settings characterized by outcome interdependence, the context within which payoffs are set influences strategy choice (Abric and Vacherot, 1976;Eiser and Bhavani, 1974), outcomes (Komorita, Aquino and Ellis, 1989) and the norms determining outcomes (Loewenstein, Thompson and Bazerman, 1989).…”

The development of interpersonal strategy: Autism, theory-of-mind, cooperation and fairness

“…Hence, the identity of the opponent makes a signiWcant diVerence in the likelihood that a player chooses to cooperate. If the opponent's identity is changed from human to machine, even though the pre-programmed strategy is unaltered, experimental participants are far more likely to cooperate with the former rather than the latter: 58% versus 41% in Abric and Kahan (1972), and 59% versus 31% in Kiesler, Sproull, and Waters (1996). These two results suggest that the more "human" a counterpart is to a player, the more likely that player is to cooperate in the PD.…”

To deceive or not to deceive: The effect of deception on behavior in future laboratory experiments

“…There is evidence that, in the prisoners' dilemma, players cooperate more often when they are playing with another human than they do when playing with a computer (Abric and Kahan, 1972;Kiesler et al, 1996;Rilling et al, 2004). Thus, we hypothesized that those players who had been deceived in the past would suspect they might be playing against a computer and would thus cooperate less often in the prisoners' dilemma.…”