2021
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewab010
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The Effects of Private Damage Claims on Cartel Activity: Experimental Evidence

Abstract: Private damage claims against cartels may have negative effects on leniency: whereas whistleblowers obtain full immunity regarding the public cartel fines, they have no or only restricted protection against private third-party damage claims. This may stabilize cartels. We run an experiment to study this issue. Firms choose whether to join a cartel, may apply for leniency afterward, and then potentially face private damages. We find that the implementation of private damage claims reduces cartel formation but m… Show more

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Cited by 7 publications
(1 citation statement)
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“…Their design also includes open communication, which they argue builds trust and reduces whistle-blowing. Bodnar, Fremerey, Normann, and Schad (2021) are concerned with the effect of the ability to sue colluding firms for damages on the effectiveness of a leniency policy. In their leniency system, the first whistle blower receives a full fine exemption and the second receives a 50% reduction.…”
Section: Previous Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Their design also includes open communication, which they argue builds trust and reduces whistle-blowing. Bodnar, Fremerey, Normann, and Schad (2021) are concerned with the effect of the ability to sue colluding firms for damages on the effectiveness of a leniency policy. In their leniency system, the first whistle blower receives a full fine exemption and the second receives a 50% reduction.…”
Section: Previous Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%