2010
DOI: 10.1007/s10490-010-9208-6
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The effects of ownership concentration and corporate debt on corporate divestitures in Chinese listed firms

Abstract: Corporate divestitures, Ownership concentration, Corporate debt, State control, Principal–principal conflicts, China,

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Cited by 39 publications
(26 citation statements)
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References 103 publications
(113 reference statements)
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“…Whereas most empirical studies of the impacts of corporate governance features focus on performance measures, Wu, Xu, and Phan (2011 in this issue) discuss and assess how ownership concentration and state ownership of Chinese companies affect strategic behavior. Specifically, they examine how ownership concentration and corporate debt affect corporate divestitures and how that linkage is conditioned by state ownership.…”
Section: Economic Implications Of Asian Corporate Governancementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Whereas most empirical studies of the impacts of corporate governance features focus on performance measures, Wu, Xu, and Phan (2011 in this issue) discuss and assess how ownership concentration and state ownership of Chinese companies affect strategic behavior. Specifically, they examine how ownership concentration and corporate debt affect corporate divestitures and how that linkage is conditioned by state ownership.…”
Section: Economic Implications Of Asian Corporate Governancementioning
confidence: 99%
“…China is not included because most listed firms there are state-owned and family ownership and control of large listed firms are very rare(Luo, Wan, & Cai, 2011;Peng, 2004;Wang & Judge, 2011;Wu, Xu, & Phan, 2011). However, most recently family-owned firms have been listed(Ding, Zhang, & Zhang, 2008).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…State ownership constitutes a form of ownership concentration. Holding the majority of the shares, the state can exert power over other investors : Wu et al (2011) established a model, in which corporate divestiture decreases the possibility of majority shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders. In their sample of Chinese PLCs they find evidence supporting their hypothesis: With the existence of ownership concentration, the amount corporate divestiture decreases.…”
Section: Board Of Directors Reportingmentioning
confidence: 99%