Are family ownership and control in large firms good, bad, or irrelevant?

Jiang, Yaming; Peng, Mike W.

doi:10.1007/s10490-010-9228-2

Cited by 198 publications

(181 citation statements)

References 94 publications

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“…If the family ownership is more efficient and the agency is better, there is no problem between the interest of the agent and the principal, which means that the management will lead the company as well as possible for the benefit of the "family" so that the company will be run efficiently and honestly. Jiang and Peng (2011) find that the presence of CEO who has family relationship can enhance companies' stock return (in Indonesia and Taiwan). Therefore, a company with a high family ownership will have a low tendency to conduct fault compared to companies that have a low family ownership.…”

Section: Ownership Structurementioning

confidence: 99%

The Influence of Board of Commissioners and Audit Committee Effectiveness, Ownership Structure, Bank Monitoring, and Firm Life Cycle on Accounting Fraud

Kusumawati¹,

Hermawan²

2013

JAKI

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Financial statement fraud has cost market participants, including investors, employees, creditors, and pensioners. Capital market participants expect active and vigilant AbstrakKecurangan pelaporan keuangan menimbulkan kerugian bagi pelaku pasar, antara lain investor, pegawai, kreditur. Kecurangan ini juga merupakan ancaman yang serius bagi para pelaku pasar modal. Pelaku pasar modal mengharapkan laporan keuangan yang transparan, berkualitas, dan dapat dipercaya integritasnya. Penelitian ini bertujuan menguji pengaruh efektifitas peran dewan komisaris dan komite audit, struktur kepemilikan, peran monitoring bank, dan siklus hidup perusahaan terhadap probabilita terjadinya kecurangan pelaporan keuangan. Pengujian hipotesis dilakukan dengan menggunakan metode regresi logistik dengan menggunakan data sanksi yang dikenakan pada perusahaan yang melakukan kecurangan pelaporan keuangan, yang diperoleh dari Bapepam-LK dari tahun 2005 sampai dengan 2011. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa efektifitas peran komite audit dan struktur kepemilikan keluarga berpengaruh negatif terhadap probabilita terjadinya kecurangan pelaporan keuangan. Hal ini mengindikasikan efektifitas komite audit dan kepemilikan yang dikendalikan oleh keluarga dapat mengurangi probabilita terjadinya kecurangan pelaporan keuangan.Kata Kunci : fraud, corporate governance, efektifitas komite audit, struktur kepemilikan, pengawasan bank, siklus hidup perusahaan.

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Section: Ownership Structurementioning

confidence: 99%

The Influence of Board of Commissioners and Audit Committee Effectiveness, Ownership Structure, Bank Monitoring, and Firm Life Cycle on Accounting Fraud

Kusumawati¹,

Hermawan²

2013

JAKI

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“…Some evidence suggests that family owners may have superior monitoring abilities compared to diffused shareholders, especially when this is combined with family control over management and the boards of firms (Anderson & Reeb, 2004) Other evidence suggests that family owners may create conflicts between dominant and minority shareholders, which they call a "principal-principal" form of agency conflict (Young et al, 2008). Governance problems associated with family control are typically related to the increased likelihood of the abuse of power (Jiang & Peng, 2011). Research from North America (e.g.…”

Section: The Governance Roles Of Dominant Shareholders and Investor Pmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate governance and national institutions: A review and emerging research agenda

2012

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“…Because SOEs have strong financial and legal support from the home country government, they may have other agendas than legal and reputational bonding when cross-listing. A third prominent type of firms in EE is family firms (Globerman, Peng, & Shapiro, 2011;Jiang & Peng, 2011). Doidge and his colleagues (2009a) find that family firms in EE are less likely to cross-list in the United States if the controlling shareholders can consume private benefits.…”

Section: Limitations and Future Research Directionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cross-listing and the scope of the firm

Peng¹,

Su²

2014

Journal of World Business

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Abstract"What determines the scope of the firm?" is one of the most fundamental questions in strategic management and international business. Yet no previous research has investigated the relationship between the scope of the firm and cross-listing-a firm listing its stock on overseas exchanges. We leverage the resource-based and institution-based views with a focus on cross-listed firms from emerging economies. We predict that cross-listing may result in a narrower product scope in the short run, a wider product scope in the long run, an expanded geographic scope overall, and a higher propensity to engage in mergers and acquisitions in the host country.

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Are family ownership and control in large firms good, bad, or irrelevant?

Abstract: Family ownership, Family firms, Institution-based theory of corporate governance, Principal-principal conflicts,

Cited by 198 publications

References 94 publications

The Influence of Board of Commissioners and Audit Committee Effectiveness, Ownership Structure, Bank Monitoring, and Firm Life Cycle on Accounting Fraud

The Influence of Board of Commissioners and Audit Committee Effectiveness, Ownership Structure, Bank Monitoring, and Firm Life Cycle on Accounting Fraud

Corporate governance and national institutions: A review and emerging research agenda

Cross-listing and the scope of the firm

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