The effects of centralising electoral management board design^*

Abstract

The public administration of elections frequently fails. Variation in the performance of electoral management boards around the world has been demonstrated, illustrated by delays in the count, inaccurate or incomplete voter registers, or severe queues at polling stations. Centralising the management of the electoral process has often been proposed as a solution. There has been little theorisation and no empirical investigations into the effects that centralising an already decentralised system would have, however. This article addresses this lacuna by conceptualising centralisation through the literature on bureaucratic control and discretion. It then empirically investigates the effects through a case study of centralisation in two UK referendums. Semi-structured interviews were used with those who devised the policy instrument and those who were subject to it. The introduction of central directions had some of the desired effects such as producing more consistent services and eliminating errors. It also had side effects, however, such as reducing economic efficiency in some areas and overlooking local knowledge. Furthermore, the reforms caused a decline of staff morale, job satisfaction and souring of relations among stakeholder organisations. The process of making organisational change therefore warrants closer attention by policy makers and future scholarship on electoral integrity. Dr. Toby S. James University of East Anglia, UK t.s.james@uea.ac.uk www.tobsjames.com Accepted manuscript to be published in Policy Studies.Improving the quality of public administration is a pressing concern for policy makers worldwide. A surprisingly fresh area of concern for national and international organisations has been the public administration of elections ( There have been no published academic studies on the effects that centralising electoral management might have, however. This article uses the literature from public administration on bureaucratic control and discretion to theorise the likely effects of centralisation. It then tests the theoretical expectations with a case study of where centralisation has occurred. In two UK referendums in 2011 the central Electoral Management Board (EMB), the Electoral Commission, gave centralised directions to local officials. Long existing systems of local management were therefore overridden. Semi-structured interviews were undertaken with those officials who designed the policy mechanism as well as those who were subjected to it to identify its effects. The article finds that the introduction of 'command and control' directions from the centre enabled more consistent service provision and led to the early identification and remedy of errors by administrators. However, it also led to side-effects such as reducing efficiency in some areas and overlooking of local knowledge. Furthermore, the reforms caused a decline of staff morale, job satisfaction and soured of relations amongst stakeholder organisations. These are known to be important drivers of organisational performa...

Electoral integrity – The winner takes it all? Evidence from three British general elections

“…On the other hand, the national-level Electoral Commission has only existed since 2001. Although the Commission has no formal control over local authorities (James, 2017), it does have reporting oversight and is active in providing guidance to local authorities, candidates and electoral agents. Thus, we may expect to observe some improvement in evaluations over time as the Commission's guidance is adopted more widely.…”

“…This district or constituency-level focus is highly significant, because in the UK case, at least, problems with electoral fraud and electoral integrity may be localised rather than being a national problem (Clark and James, 2015; Electoral Commission, 2014: 3; Stewart, 2006). 1 Equally, as James (2017: 133) shows, the US experience is such that variations in the quality of electoral administration and failings in electoral integrity are frequently attributed to the decentralised management of elections. A similar system operates in the United Kingdom, where despite central guidance being distributed by the Electoral Commission, the administration of elections is managed by local authorities.…”

Electoral management and the organisational determinants of electoral integrity: Introduction

“…federal and state level EMBs; or national and municipal EMBs). This is relevant for EMB performance because organising elections closer to local constituencies may make electoral management more efficient and sensitive to local needs (James, 2017). Conversely, decentralised election management may also generate significant differences in EMB performance within a country, as research on the highly decentralised election management systems in the USA and the UK has shown (Bowler et al, 2015;Clark, 2016;James, 2017 Clark, 2016; James and Jervier, 2017)?…”

Better workers, better elections? Electoral management body workforces and electoral integrity worldwide

“…10 Lastly, a control is introduced for whether electoral management is delivered by a local or central body. 11 There are often arguments made that one type is more efficient than the other (James, 2017), so it is important to control for this. However, it is also important because some of the HR management practices and employee outcomes might have different effects on performance depending on whether the organisation is a local or national organisation.…”

“…Equally, although electoral management can be centralised in one organisation, that organisation can be geographically dispersed across a polity. Research has explored the effects of central organisations issuing directions to local organisations (James, 2017) or devising best practice benchmarking schemes (James, forthcoming). No cross-national studies have explored and compared the characteristics of workforces running elections, however.…”