The Effects of Asset Forfeiture on Policing: A Panel Approach

Kelly, Brian D.; Kole, Maureen

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2335161

Cited by 8 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“… In 2015, assets seized by state governments are estimated to be around $1 billion (Kelly and Kole ). The amount seized varies considerably from year to year, but the value of assets seized by state governments was likely significant in 2013.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Special Moral Obligations of Law Enforcement

Monaghan

2017

J Political Philosophy

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mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Special Moral Obligations of Law Enforcement

Monaghan

2017

J Political Philosophy

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“…al., 1995;Boudreaux and Pritchard, 1996;Mast et. al., 2000;Worrall, 2001, Baicker andJacobson, 2007;Kelly and Kole, 2016).…”

Section: Department Of Justice's Asset Forfeiture and Money Launderinmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Because the CCCA was implemented nationwide at the same time, many researchers have focused on simple pre–post comparisons (Benson, Rasmussen, and Sollars 1995), but this approach may not account for secular changes in crime over time. Alternatively, other scholars have sought to correlate the value of forfeitures with crime, police effort (arrests), or municipal budget allocations (Kelly and Kole 2016). The allocation of police resources and police budgets, however, are all likely to be simultaneously determined with the level of forfeiture activity, or suffer from reverse causality.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Civil Asset Forfeiture, Crime, and Police Incentives: Evidence From the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984

Kantor

Kitchens

Pawlowski³

2020

Economic Inquiry

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We thank William Collins and Robert Margo for sharing their 1960s race riot data. Additionally, we thank Nicholas Duquette, Trevon Logan, and David Rasmussen, as well as seminar and conference participants at Florida State University and the Western Economic Association Annual Meetings, for valuable comments. All views expressed in this paper are the authors' and do not represent those of any institution. Any errors are our own. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. At least one co-author has disclosed a financial relationship of potential relevance for this research. Further information is available online at http://www.nber.org/papers/w23873.ack NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications.

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“…There were very few, and only minor, differences, between our scores and those reported in Carpenter et al (2015). Where differences did exist, we chose to code in a conservative manner and that was less likely to support our hypotheses (e.g., see Holcomb et al, 2011). asset forfeiture research (e.g., Benson et al, 1995;Kelly and Kole, 2016;Mast et al, 2000;Worrall and Kovandzic, 2008). Although Holcomb et al (2011) used per capita equitable sharing payments as the dependent variable, we prefer the use of population as a control variable because it allows us to test the precise nature of the association between population size and equitable sharing.…”

Section: Control Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It is this revenue-generating feature of civil forfeiture that has raised the most scholarly and media criticism (e.g., Blumenson and Nilsen, 1998;Duffy, 2001;Hadaway, 2000;Levy, 1996;Skolnick, 2008;Stillman, 2013;Stuteville, 2014). Together, these features of civil forfeiture laws represent varying degrees of burdens and rewards to law enforcement for such actions (Blumenson and Nilsen, 1998;Kelly and Kole, 2016;Mast, Benson, and Rasmussen, 2000).…”

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confidence: 99%

Civil Asset Forfeiture Laws and Equitable Sharing Activity by the Police

Holcomb

Williams

Hicks

et al. 2018

Criminology & Public Policy

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Research Summary For several decades, critics have argued that civil forfeiture laws create incentives for law enforcement to increase departmental revenue by “policing for profit.” By using data on federal equitable sharing payments to nearly 600 local law enforcement agencies between 2000 and 2012, we examine the relationship between the characteristics of state forfeiture laws and equitable sharing payments to local agencies. Our results indicate that agencies in states with state laws that are more restrictive or less rewarding to police collect more in federal equitable sharing. This finding supports the critics’ argument that police behavior in regard to forfeiture activities is influenced by the financial rewards and burdens involved. Policy Implications Our results reveal that the findings of investigative journalism and case study research, that is, that police forfeiture activities are influenced by financial rewards, may be more generalizable to law enforcement than previously thought. Despite recent state‐level reforms, federal equitable sharing and most state forfeiture laws provide limited due process protections and have minimal accountability or reporting requirements. Concerns about the impact of civil forfeiture practices on perceptions of procedural justice and police legitimacy are discussed, and possible policy reforms are reviewed.

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The Effects of Asset Forfeiture on Policing: A Panel Approach

Cited by 8 publications

References 21 publications

The Special Moral Obligations of Law Enforcement

The Special Moral Obligations of Law Enforcement

Civil Asset Forfeiture, Crime, and Police Incentives: Evidence From the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984

Civil Asset Forfeiture Laws and Equitable Sharing Activity by the Police

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