Civil Asset Forfeiture, Crime, and Police Incentives: Evidence From the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984

Abstract

We thank William Collins and Robert Margo for sharing their 1960s race riot data. Additionally, we thank Nicholas Duquette, Trevon Logan, and David Rasmussen, as well as seminar and conference participants at Florida State University and the Western Economic Association Annual Meetings, for valuable comments. All views expressed in this paper are the authors' and do not represent those of any institution. Any errors are our own. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. At least one co-author has disclosed a financial relationship of potential relevance for this research. Further information is available online at http://www.nber.org/papers/w23873.ack NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications.

Policing American Cities: Crisis and Reform from the Seventeenth to the Twenty-First Centuries

“…And because narcotics' sizeable profits can generate substantial assets, police officers have an incentive to prioritize drug crimes over those where enforcement holds no promise of remuneration-enlarging the war on drugs in the process. Forfeiture clearly reoriented police priorities in that fashion in the 1990s; how much it still does is a matter of debate (Kantor et al, 2021;Kelly & Kole, 2016). And while the practice was originally intended to target the wealth enjoyed by organized crime and drug kingpins, police now routinely wield the tool against those of more modest means: in 2018, the median nationwide forfeiture was $1276; in Michigan, half of all cash forfeitures were smaller than $423; in Pennsylvania, that median was $369.…”

Tax Fraud and Selective Law Enforcement

“…There is significant indication that the approval of asset confiscation legislation, which allowed US police departments to keep part of the confiscated funds from drug-related crimes, created revenue dependency 177 and distorted police behaviour, 178 leading some to argue that the notion of 'policing for profit' could not be dismissed. 179 Indeed, not only did the legislation lead to sharp increases in drug arrests, but there was also evidence of associated costly negative externalities, such as a 22 per cent increase in traffic fatalities, as resources were reallocated from activities that were not rewarded with performance incentives (traffic control) to those that were (drug control). Concerns over these distortive effects were reportedly behind the decision taken in Canada to distribute all financial gains resulting from asset confiscation amongst the various divisions of the police force, rather than allowing those directly connected to the case to keep all of the profits.…”