The Effects of Asset Forfeiture on Policing: A Panel Approach

Abstract

Asset forfeiture has proven highly controversial in the United States since its expansion in 1984. Most contentious is the widespread policy that allows police agencies to keep the assets seized, which both proponents and critics assert changes police behavior. From newly developed panel data sets, we find some statistical support for the proposition that police agencies change the intensity and pattern of policing in response to forfeiture. However, in economic terms these effects are very weak and do not support the proposition that forfeiture provides vital funds and incentives for crime policing. (JEL H39, H71, K42)

Civil Asset Forfeiture Laws and Equitable Sharing Activity by the Police

“…Because population is likely related to opportunities for forfeiture activity by police (via number of citizens, number of police officers, etc. ), controlling for population in some manner is common practice in asset forfeiture research (e.g., Benson et al., ; Kelly and Kole, ; Mast et al., ; Worrall and Kovandzic, ). Although Holcomb et al.…”

“…We believe this is a better approach for several reasons. Although some prior research has been aimed at examining the relationship between forfeiture proceeds and arrest data (e.g., Bishopp and Worrall, ; Kelly and Kole, ), the causal order of that relationship is not entirely obvious. It is possible that more arrests will lead to more forfeitures.…”

“…It is this revenue‐generating feature of civil forfeiture that has raised the most scholarly and media criticism (e.g., Blumenson and Nilsen, ; Duffy, ; Hadaway, ; Levy, ; Skolnick, ; Stillman, ; Stuteville, ). Together, these features of civil forfeiture laws represent varying degrees of burdens and rewards to law enforcement for such actions (Blumenson and Nilsen, ; Kelly and Kole, ; Mast, Benson, and Rasmussen, ).…”

“…There seem to be two major strains of empirical research on asset forfeiture. One major theme in the empirical research on forfeiture is aimed at examining the relationship between forfeiture proceeds and police budgets (e.g., Benson et al., ; Mast et al., ) or police behavior (Kelly and Kole, ; Miller and Selva, ; Vecchi and Sigler, ). The latter research has primarily been focused on a single jurisdiction or without reference to the impact of legal differences across jurisdictions.…”

Public policies against criminal assets in mexico: challenges and opportunities from the north border states

“…The states share these instruments through their laws on fiscal evasion, extinction of domain, and the prosecution of transactions with illicit proceeds [25], but only a few states have put these laws into practice. One of the most common instruments implemented against the assets of crime and money laundering is asset forfeiture 3 [40,41]. The legal concept developed in Mexico is "extinction of domain," which is very similar to "extinction of ownership" as developed in countries like Spain, and "civil asset forfeiture," as developed in countries like Ireland, South Africa, and the United States.…”