The effect of the CEO’s characteristics on EM: evidence from Jordan

Abstract

Purpose This study aims to examine the effect of CEO’s personal characteristics on earnings management (EM) practices. Design/methodology/approach The authors use panel data for 201 non-financial companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) for the period 2008-2013. The authors use random effect models to test the hypothesis of this study and extent the analysis to family versus non-family. Findings The study finds a positive relation between CEO’s overconfidence and EM practices in Jordan. Moreover, the findings reveal that managers in family companies are more likely to engage in EM practices than non-family companies. The findings shed more light on the intricate relationship between CEO’s characteristics, the decision-making process and financial reporting. Practical implications Results of this study could be beneficial for a number of users of financial information such as investors, auditors, regulators, lenders, as well other players in the capital market to make right decisions. Originality/value A literature review finds that much less studies have investigated the relationship between EM practices and personal CEO characteristics (gender and overconfidence) in developing countries such as Jordan. Furthermore, no study yet has examined the influence of CEO age on EM practices. The authors extend previous literature by providing empirical evidence about effect of some personal CEO’s characteristics on EM practices.

Surplus Free Cash Flow, Stock Market Segmentations and Earnings Management: The Moderating Role of Independent Audit Committee

“…For example, Al Qallap (2014) indicated that 26.2 per cent of service companies in Jordan engaged in earnings manipulation, and Abbadi et al (2016) found that companies listed on ASE manipulated their earnings because the average of the DAC was 0.096. Alqatamin et al (2017) documented similar findings with a mean of DAC of 0.097. concluded that the mean of the absolute value of DAC was 9.3 per cent, which indicates that, on an average, the managers of the listed companies on ASE practised earnings management. Finally, Kanakriyah et al (2017) found that public companies in Jordan manipulated the reported earnings at a high level with a mean of 3.772.…”

CEO characteristics and earnings management: empirical evidence from France

“…Earnings management is the ability of the managers to manipulate reported earnings by using discretion in accounting principles. In fact, a well-known process called earnings management is adopted by several executives to manipulate the accounting results of the company through accounting choices and discretionary accruals (Alqatamin et al, 2017). Several studies (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994;Healy and Wahlen, 1999;Baker et al, 2009) have proven that managers are encouraged to manage accounting results for several reasons, even though maximizing the value of the company and improving its financial quality are objectives that must be respected by all members of the company.…”

“…The entrenchment expresses the will of the CEO to free themselves, totally or at least partially, from the control of the shareholders, while developing specific strategies that allow him or her to achieve the objectives: to increase his/her freedom of action, to improve his/ her discretionary power and to neutralize the various disciplinary mechanisms. Nonetheless, the relationship between a manager's personal characteristics and performance management practices remains ambiguous and controversial (Alqatamin et al, 2017). The purpose of this study is to gain an understanding of whether specific characteristics, such as age, tenure, duality, board membership, gender, compensation, turnover, experience, and nationality, influence earnings management practices.…”

Behavior Towards R&D Investment of Family Firms CEOs: The Role of Psychological Attribute

“…65 Family firms are much committed to maintaining the long-run sustainability of the firm by avoiding things that can negatively affect the firm. Similarly, Alqatamin, Aribi and Arun 66 revealed that family firms incline to do SEW protection contrary to non-family firms. The reason is that family firms and family firm CEOs with actual control over the management and high access to information on the firm can maximize personal benefits and avoid R&D investment.…”