2016
DOI: 10.17265/1548-6583/2016.01.003
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The Effect of the 2007/2008 Financial Crisis on Enterprise Risk Management Disclosure of Top US Banks

Abstract: We document the effect of the 2007/2008 financial crisis on the volume and the quality of enterprise risk management (ERM) disclosure in the annual reports of the largest US banks, and analyze its determinants.Using a content analysis approach of the annual reports form 10-K for the years 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009, we find that the ERM disclosure is significantly and positively associated with the crisis, bank size, board independence, duality and significantly and negatively associated with profitability,… Show more

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Cited by 7 publications
(11 citation statements)
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References 24 publications
(69 reference statements)
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“…The revelation implies that RFDs reduce information asymmetry similar to the effect of corporate disclosures in agency relationships (Campbell et al 2014;Chiu et al 2019). Some studies argue that disclosure theory is applicable to RFDs because managers are eager to share good news and delay disclosure of bad news (Filzen 2015;Li et al 2018;Nelson and Pritchard 2016;Ott 2020;Tsai et al 2016;Zeghal and El Aoun 2016). The inclination to delay bad news can also explain managerial discretion in the choice of language and tone and in the length and informativeness of disclosures.…”
Section: Theoretical Framework Of Rfd Researchmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…The revelation implies that RFDs reduce information asymmetry similar to the effect of corporate disclosures in agency relationships (Campbell et al 2014;Chiu et al 2019). Some studies argue that disclosure theory is applicable to RFDs because managers are eager to share good news and delay disclosure of bad news (Filzen 2015;Li et al 2018;Nelson and Pritchard 2016;Ott 2020;Tsai et al 2016;Zeghal and El Aoun 2016). The inclination to delay bad news can also explain managerial discretion in the choice of language and tone and in the length and informativeness of disclosures.…”
Section: Theoretical Framework Of Rfd Researchmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The political costs hypothesis explains that highly leveraged firms increase disclosure information to reduce the risk premium attached to debts and subsequently reduce the cost of capital (Zeghal and El Aoun 2016). Firms' level of disclosure can depend on a transparency motivation such that more detailed disclosure will lower information asymmetry, or on an opaqueness motivation that will ensure only generic risks are disclosed to avoid uncertainty among shareholders about the risk level (Ott 2020).…”
Section: Theoretical Framework Of Rfd Researchmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A válság tovább növelte a bankok kockázatkezelési rendszeréről és szolvenciájáról közzétett adatok jelentőségét. Ezt igazolja a kutatásunk alapgondolatát adó cikk (Zeghal -Aoun, 2016), amely az Egyesült Államok bankszektorára vonatkozóan értékeli az átfogó kockázatkezelési rendszerről szóló közzétételek tartalmá-nak és minőségének változását a 2007-es pénzügyi vál-ság hatására. Cikkükben 59 amerikai bank éves jelentését elemezték.…”
Section: Cikkek Tanulmányokunclassified
“…Global financial crises and major corporate collapses have rekindled the debate about the importance of including risk information in financial reports. This is attributed to the needs of stakeholders for valuable relevant information about companies' activities in order to accurately assess their financial position (Uddin & Hassan 2011;Zeghal & Aoun, 2016). As a response to those global events, regulatory institutions had to reassess the foundations of companies' regulations (ElKelish & Hassan, 2014;Beltratti & Stulz, 2012).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%