The Effect of Interest Group Pressure on Favorable Regulatory Decisions: The Case of Certificate-of-Need Laws

Stratmann, Thomas; Monaghan, Steven

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3046838

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 20 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Where data are available, however, they suggest that approval is far from guaranteed. One recent study found that from 1996 to 2014, the approval rate in Georgia was approximately 57 percent, in Michigan it was 77 percent, and in Virginia it was 51 percent (Stratmann and Monaghan 2017). Controversially, employees of existing providers often sit on CON boards.…”

Section: Certificate-of-needmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Economics of a Bed Shortage: Certificate-of-Need Regulation and Hospital Bed Utilization during the COVID-19 Pandemic

Mitchell

Stratmann

2021

JRFM

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Certificate-of-need (CON) laws are intended to restrain health care spending by limiting the acquisition of duplicative capital and the initiation of unnecessary services. Critics contend that need is difficult to objectively assess, especially considering the risks and uncertainty inherent in health care. We compare statewide bed utilization rates and hospital-level bed utilization rates in bed CON and non-bed CON states during the COVID-19 pandemic. Controlling for other possibly confounding factors, we find that states with bed CONs had 12 percent higher bed utilization rates and 58 percent more days in which more than 70 percent of their beds were used. Individual hospitals in bed CON states were 27 percent more likely to utilize all of their beds. States that relaxed CON requirements to make it easier for hospitals to meet the surge in demand did not experience any statistically significant decreases in bed utilization or number of days above 70 percent of capacity. Nor were hospitals in states that relaxed their CON requirements any less likely to use all their beds. Certificate-of-need laws seem to have exacerbated the risk of running out of beds during the COVID-19 pandemic. State efforts to relax these rules had little immediate effect on reducing this risk.

show abstract

Section: Certificate-of-needmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Economics of a Bed Shortage: Certificate-of-Need Regulation and Hospital Bed Utilization during the COVID-19 Pandemic

Mitchell

Stratmann

2021

JRFM

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Certificate of Need Laws in Health Care: Past, Present, and Future

Mitchell

2024

INQUIRY

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Certificate of need (CON) laws limit the supply of health care services in about two-thirds of U.S. states. The regulations require those who wish to offer new services or expand existing services to first prove to a regulator that the care is needed. While advocates for the regulation have offered several rationales for its continuance, the balance of evidence suggests that the rules protect incumbent providers from competition at the expense of patients, payors, and would-be competitors. In this article, I review the history of CON laws in health care, summarize the large literature evaluating them, and briefly sketch options for reform. JEL Classification: I11, I18, H75

show abstract

The Effect of Interest Group Pressure on Favorable Regulatory Decisions: The Case of Certificate-of-Need Laws

Cited by 2 publications

References 20 publications

The Economics of a Bed Shortage: Certificate-of-Need Regulation and Hospital Bed Utilization during the COVID-19 Pandemic

The Economics of a Bed Shortage: Certificate-of-Need Regulation and Hospital Bed Utilization during the COVID-19 Pandemic

Certificate of Need Laws in Health Care: Past, Present, and Future

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About