“…Similarly, the nuances of syndicate design seem especially dependent on the existence of specific types of underwriters, such as large and diversified investment banks, specialist banks, and peripheral dealers. Nevertheless, whether it is the cocoa market in Ghana (Southall, 1978), the Canadian tourism market (Reimer, 1990), the market for employee talent (Finlay & Coverdill, 2000), the residential real estate market (Halpern, 1996), the New York stock exchange (Abolafia, 1996), or purchases of agricultural technology (McIntosh & Zey-Ferrell, 1986), our model of the brokering process summarized in Figure 3 suggests that the network architect's situation can be described as a set of background forces that influence the broker's motivations and capabilities as a market mediator, a set of deal network attributes over which the broker can exert at least some control, and a set of transaction outcomes that are partially determined by the broker's network design choices. As described in Table 1, within the boundaries of a broker's situation, the broker's accumulated social resources, the broker's dependence on the market as a source of profits, and the exogenous properties of the deal, such as the desirability of the assets being exchanged, are important in influencing how the broker goes about building and managing a given transaction network.…”