The effect of decision frame and decision justification on risky choice

Takemura, Kazuhisa

doi:10.4992/psycholres1954.35.36

Cited by 68 publications

(47 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…Indeed, they seem to focus attention on the single tasks in which payoffs can be earned, and thus lead subjects to consider the two frames in isolation. These findings are consistent with previous studies (Kühberger et al 2002;Takemura 1993). When accountability and incentives are both present, preference reversals are reduced-an effect that is however shown to be entirely due to accountability.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 92%

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Separating real incentives and accountability

Vieider¹

2011

Exp Econ

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Accountability-the expectation on the side of the decision maker that she may have to justify her decisions in front of somebody else-has been found by psychologists to strongly influence decision-making processes. The awareness of this issue remains however limited amongst economists, who tend to focus on the motivational effects of financial incentives. Accountability and incentives may provide different motivations for decision makers, and disentangling their effects is thus important for understanding real-world situations in which both are present. Separating accountability and incentives, I find different effects. Accountability is found to reduce preference reversals between frames, for which incentives have no effect. Incentives on the other hand are found to reduce risk seeking for losses, where accountability has no effect. In a choice task between simple and compound events, accountability increases the preference for the normatively superior simple event, while incentives have a weaker effect going in the opposite direction.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 92%

“…Accountability has been found to reduce framing effects for problems of this type, both for within subject designs (Takemura 1993) and for between subject designs (Miller and Fagley 1991;Takemura 1994). Framing effects have also been found to persist under monetary incentives (Kühberger 1998;Kühberger et al 2002).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Separating real incentives and accountability

Vieider¹

2011

Exp Econ

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“…The remaining participants read only 'Given the facts above, please tell us which option you prefer', whereupon they checked their preferred option. This is similar to a manipulation followed by Miller and Fagley (1991), Levin and Chapman (1990), and Takemura (1993, 1994, among others. …”

mentioning

confidence: 65%

“…High-NC participants did not show framing effects, whereas low-NC participants did, although ensuing research by Levin et al (2002) modifies these findings in ways we discuss later. Takemura (1993Takemura ( , 1994 reports further studies that yield divergent results. In one study (1994), participants who provided justification did not show the framing effect, but in another study (1993) a framing effect persisted even when justification was elicited.…”

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confidence: 99%

Deep thoughts and shallow frames: on the susceptibility to framing effects

LeBoeuf

Shafir

2003

Behavioral Decision Making

198

174

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This paper examines the occurrence of framing effects when more thought is given to problems. In Study 1, participants were presented with one of two frames of several decision problems. Participants' Need for Cognition (NC) scores were obtained, and half the participants were asked to justify their choices. Substantial framing effects were observed, but the amount of thought purportedly given to a problem, whether manipulated by justification elicitation or measured by NC scores, did not reduce the incidence of framing effects. In Study 2, participants responded to both frames of problems in a within-subjects design. Again, NC scores were unrelated to responses on the first frame encountered. However, high-NC, compared to low-NC, participants were more consistent across frames of a problem. More thought, as indexed here, does not reduce the proclivity to be framed, but does promote adherence to normative principles when the applicability of those principles is detectable. Copyright # 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. key words framing effects; decision making; choice; need for cognition; justificationprovisionThe familiar conundrum of the glass that is either half full or half empty captures a fundamental fact about perception: different mental representations of a stimulus can be formed from different perspectives and in different contexts. Thus, a line appears longer when vertical than when horizontal; the moon looks large on the horizon but small overhead; and the prospects of an operation that appears promising in light of an 80% chance of success seem more bleak given its 20% chance of failure. In decision-making situations, the dependence of mental representation on context entails that choices can sometimes be affected by immaterial changes in perspective. In particular, 'framing effects' are said to occur whenever alternative descriptions of what is essentially the same decision problem give rise to predictably different choices (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).Framing effects have been documented in dozens of studies. Because they seem to arise from shallow reactions to superficial cues, and because they violate the assumption of well-ordered preferences, it has been suggested that these effects are largely attributable to a lack of attention and would occur less frequently if people thought more carefully about their choices (e.g. Sieck & Yates, 1997;Smith, 1985;Smith & Levin, 1996). This paper attempts a systematic examination of this proposition. FRAMING EFFECTSA framing effect is said to occur whenever different descriptions of the same decision situation lead to different preferences, despite the fact that the 'acts, outcomes, and contingencies' associated with the decision remain invariant across the descriptions, as in the now-classic Asian Disease problem (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, p. 453): Imagine that the USA is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed. Assume that the ex...

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“…It has already been demonstrated that being forced to take more time or to provide a rationale for selections reduces framing effects (Miller & Fagley, 1991;Sieck & Yates, 1997;Takemura, 1992Takemura, , 1993Takemura, , 1994 and, further, that there are consistent individual differences across a variety of framing problems when a within-subject design is employed (Frisch, 1993). In the present studies, we investigate whether such individual differences covary with measures of cognitive ability in ways predicted by the understanding/acceptance principle.…”

Section: The Understanding/acceptance Principlementioning

confidence: 84%