This chapter reviews selected findings in research on reasoning, judgment, and choice and considers the systematic ways in which people violate basic requirements of the corresponding normative analyses. Recent objections to the empirical findings are then considered; these objections question the findings' relevance to assumptions about rationality. These objections address the adequacy of the tasks used in the aforementioned research and the appropriateness of the critical interpretation of participants' responses, as well as the justifiability of some of the theoretical assumptions made by experimenters. The objections are each found not to seriously impinge on the general conclusion that people often violate tenets of rationality in inadvisable ways. In the process, relevant psychological constructs, ranging from cognitive ability and need for cognition, to dual process theories and the role of incentives, are discussed. It is proposed that the rationality critique is compelling and rightfully gaining influence in the social sciences in general.
This paper examines the occurrence of framing effects when more thought is given to problems. In Study 1, participants were presented with one of two frames of several decision problems. Participants' Need for Cognition (NC) scores were obtained, and half the participants were asked to justify their choices. Substantial framing effects were observed, but the amount of thought purportedly given to a problem, whether manipulated by justification elicitation or measured by NC scores, did not reduce the incidence of framing effects. In Study 2, participants responded to both frames of problems in a within-subjects design. Again, NC scores were unrelated to responses on the first frame encountered. However, high-NC, compared to low-NC, participants were more consistent across frames of a problem. More thought, as indexed here, does not reduce the proclivity to be framed, but does promote adherence to normative principles when the applicability of those principles is detectable. Copyright # 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. key words framing effects; decision making; choice; need for cognition; justificationprovisionThe familiar conundrum of the glass that is either half full or half empty captures a fundamental fact about perception: different mental representations of a stimulus can be formed from different perspectives and in different contexts. Thus, a line appears longer when vertical than when horizontal; the moon looks large on the horizon but small overhead; and the prospects of an operation that appears promising in light of an 80% chance of success seem more bleak given its 20% chance of failure. In decision-making situations, the dependence of mental representation on context entails that choices can sometimes be affected by immaterial changes in perspective. In particular, 'framing effects' are said to occur whenever alternative descriptions of what is essentially the same decision problem give rise to predictably different choices (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).Framing effects have been documented in dozens of studies. Because they seem to arise from shallow reactions to superficial cues, and because they violate the assumption of well-ordered preferences, it has been suggested that these effects are largely attributable to a lack of attention and would occur less frequently if people thought more carefully about their choices (e.g. Sieck & Yates, 1997;Smith, 1985;Smith & Levin, 1996). This paper attempts a systematic examination of this proposition. FRAMING EFFECTSA framing effect is said to occur whenever different descriptions of the same decision situation lead to different preferences, despite the fact that the 'acts, outcomes, and contingencies' associated with the decision remain invariant across the descriptions, as in the now-classic Asian Disease problem (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, p. 453): Imagine that the USA is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed. Assume that the ex...
Increasing accuracy motivation (e.g., by providing monetary incentives for accuracy) often fails to increase adjustment away from provided anchors, a result that has led researchers to conclude that people do not effortfully adjust away from such anchors. We challenge this conclusion. First, we show that people are typically uncertain about which way to adjust from provided anchors and that this uncertainty often causes people to believe that they have initially adjusted too far away from such anchors (Studies 1a and 1b). Then, we show that although accuracy motivation fails to increase the gap between anchors and final estimates when people are uncertain about the direction of adjustment, accuracy motivation does increase anchor-estimate gaps when people are certain about the direction of adjustment, and that this is true regardless of whether the anchors are provided or self-generated (Studies 2, 3a, 3b, and 5). These results suggest that people do effortfully adjust away from provided anchors but that uncertainty about the direction of adjustment makes that adjustment harder to detect than previously assumed. This conclusion has important theoretical implications, suggesting that currently emphasized distinctions between anchor types (self-generated vs. provided) are not fundamental and that ostensibly competing theories of anchoring (selective accessibility and anchoring-and-adjustment) are complementary.
Increasing accuracy motivation (e.g., by providing monetary incentives for accuracy) often fails to increase adjustment away from provided anchors, a result that has led researchers to conclude that people do not effortfully adjust away from such anchors. We challenge this conclusion. First, we show that people are typically uncertain about which way to adjust from provided anchors and that this uncertainty often causes people to believe that they have initially adjusted too far away from such anchors (Studies 1a and 1b). Then, we show that although accuracy motivation fails to increase the gap between anchors and final estimates when people are uncertain about the direction of adjustment, accuracy motivation does increase anchor-estimate gaps when people are certain about the direction of adjustment, and that this is true regardless of whether the anchors are provided or self-generated (Studies 2, 3a, 3b, and 5). These results suggest that people do effortfully adjust away from provided anchors but that uncertainty about the direction of adjustment makes that adjustment harder to detect than previously assumed. This conclusion has important theoretical implications, suggesting that currently emphasized distinctions between anchor types (self-generated vs. provided) are not fundamental and that ostensibly competing theories of anchoring (selective accessibility and anchoring-and-adjustment) are complementary.
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