The effect of communication channels on promise-making and promise-keeping: experimental evidence

Conrads, Julian; Reggiani, Tommaso

doi:10.1007/s11403-016-0177-9

Cited by 22 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…Previous studies, however, also indicate that the engagement with the commitment may vary with the form of exchange. Conrads and Reggiani (2017), for example, show that cooperation promises are more likely in real-time communication than when communication is delayed. Social psychological studies, on the other hand, point to the importance of decision autonomy in commitments.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Public cooperation statements

Koessler

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Dulleck

2021

J Econ Interact Coord

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Communication is a well-known tool to promote cooperation and pro-social behavior. In this study, we examine whether minimal communication in form of public consent with a pre-defined cooperation statement is sufficient to strengthen cooperation in groups. Within the controlled environment of a laboratory experiment, we identify ways by which non-enforceable cooperation statements are associated with higher levels of cooperation in a public good setting. At first, the statement triggers selection; socially oriented individuals are more likely to make the cooperation statement. In addition, we can show that a behavioral change takes place once the statement is made. This change can be attributed to commitment arising from the pledge and to increased coordination between the interaction partners. Depending on the institutional context, these drivers can vary in strength. Comparing compulsory and voluntary cooperation statements, we find that both are effective in motivating higher contributions to the public good.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Public cooperation statements

Koessler

Page

Dulleck

2021

J Econ Interact Coord

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“…explanation for such lack of correlation. In different experimental settings, Vanberg (2008), Kawagoe and Narita (2014), and Conrads and Reggiani (2017) also argue against guilt aversion relative to alternative explanations. Evidence in support of guilt aversion relative to alternative explanations includes Reuben et al (2009), Bellemare at al.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Responding to (un)reasonable requests by an authority

2020

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We consider the notions of static and dynamic reasonableness of requests by an authority in a trust game experiment. The authority, modelled as the experimenter, systematically varies the experimental norm of what is expected from trustees to return to trustors, both in terms of the level of each request and in terms of the sequence of the requests. Static reasonableness matters in a self-biased way, in the sense that low requests justify returning less, but high requests tend to be ignored. Dynamic reasonableness also matters, in the sense that, if requests keep increasing, trustees return less compared to the same requests presented in random or decreasing order. Requests never systematically increase trustworthiness but may decrease it.

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“…5 Example 1. Using a set of communication conditions that is closely related to ours (spanning from computer chat to audio communication, then to face-to-face communication), Conrads and Reggiani (2017) report that the outcome of communication (i.e., the rate of promise-making) varies in a systematic way: the richer and more direct the communication protocol, the more likely a subject is to make a promise to the other person. 6 At the same time, they observe little variation in the subsequent rates of promise-keeping.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…(4 point scale with 1 -"no trust at all", and 4 -"full trust"); variable SOEP trust 3 is the average score on 7 items measuring general trust in socio-economic institutions ("How much trust do you have in market economy/large companies/courts/government/parliament/other citizens/banks ", same scale as for SOEP trust 2 ). 23 Finally, political views are elicited using another SOEP question: "In politics, people often talk about "left" and "right" when describing different political views. When you think about your own political view, how would you rate them on the scale below?"…”

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confidence: 99%

Digital Communication and Swift Trust

2019

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We experimentally study the effect of the mode of digital communication on the emergence of swift trust in a principal-agent relationship. We consider three modes of communication: plain text, audio, and video. Communication is pre-play, one-way, and unrestricted, but its content is homogenized across treatments. Overall, both audio and video messages have a positive (and similar) effect on trust compared to plain text; however, the magnitude of these effects depends on the content of agent's message (promise to act trustworthily vs. no such promise). In all conditions, we observe a positive effect of the agent's promise on the principal's trust. We also find that providing visual cues about the sender promotes trust and helps overcome gender favoritism in females.

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The effect of communication channels on promise-making and promise-keeping: experimental evidence

Cited by 22 publications

References 29 publications

Public cooperation statements

Public cooperation statements

Responding to (un)reasonable requests by an authority

Digital Communication and Swift Trust

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