The effect of communication channels on dishonest behavior

Conrads, Julian; Lotz, Sebastian

doi:10.1016/j.socec.2015.06.006

Cited by 36 publications

(29 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…Although F&FH, and also Mazar et al, found no e¤ect of anonymity on cheating, other studies found sizeable e¤ects. For instance, Conrads & Lotz (2015) used a multiple-period design where subjects would ‡ip a coin four times, report the outcomes, and get paid based on the number of reported of "tails." Although partial lying became more prevalent as the channel of communication became less anonymous, dishonesty with respect to extreme and pro…t-maximizing outcomes became more prevalent with increased anonymity.…”

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confidence: 99%

Lies in disguise – A theoretical analysis of cheating

Dufwenberg

2018

Journal of Economic Theory

116

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We perform a (psychological) game-theoretic analysis of cheating in the setting proposed by Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi (2013). The key assumption, which we refer to as perceived cheating aversion, is that the decision maker derives disutility in proportion to the amount in which he is perceived to cheat. A particular equilibrium captures the stylized facts from many experiments (in particular the co-presence of selfish, honest, and partial-lie choices) well. JEL-Codes: C720, D030, D820, D830, H260. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may

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confidence: 99%

Lies in disguise – A theoretical analysis of cheating

Dufwenberg

2018

Journal of Economic Theory

116

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“…6 At the same time, they observe little variation in the subsequent rates of promise-keeping. 4 Recent studies that investigate the relationship between the mode of communication and lying behavior (see, for example, Abeler et al, 2014;Conrads and Lotz, 2015;Cohn et al, 2018) do better in controlling the content of the communication across different channels. In these studies, subjects simply need to report the outcomes of coin tosses in all the communication channels (voice, text, online-form, or face-to-face).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Digital Communication and Swift Trust

2019

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We experimentally study the effect of the mode of digital communication on the emergence of swift trust in a principal-agent relationship. We consider three modes of communication: plain text, audio, and video. Communication is pre-play, one-way, and unrestricted, but its content is homogenized across treatments. Overall, both audio and video messages have a positive (and similar) effect on trust compared to plain text; however, the magnitude of these effects depends on the content of agent's message (promise to act trustworthily vs. no such promise). In all conditions, we observe a positive effect of the agent's promise on the principal's trust. We also find that providing visual cues about the sender promotes trust and helps overcome gender favoritism in females.

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“…Indeed, a large body of experimental evidence suggests that even in the absence of reputation incentives individuals often behave in an honest, fair, and altruistic way towards other humans, but not necessarily towards organizations or machines (see, for example, Haran (2013), De Melo, Marsella, and Gratch (2016), and Cohn, Gesche, and Marechal (2018)). Prosocial behavior towards other humans has been found to decrease with social distance and to increase with the observability of individuals' behavior (e.g, Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith (1996), Conrads andLotz (2015), Della Vigna, List, andMalmendier (2015)). It might reflect an intrinsic desire for fairness and promise keeping as well as concerns about social image and hence aversion to guilt or shame (e.g., Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) and Vanberg (2008)).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Personal Communication in a Fintech World: Evidence from Loan Payments

Laudenbach

Siegel

2018

SSRN Journal

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We examine the effect of personal, two-way communication on the behavior of borrowers, who have fallen behind on their consumer loan payments. While the lender has informed all borrowers about the delinquency through an automatically generated letter, some borrowers also receive a phone call from a randomly assigned bank agent. We find that borrowers, who speak with a bank agent typically for only a few minutes, are significantly more likely to make timely payments and significantly less likely to default. This finding holds in a subset of hard-to-reach borrowers as well as when we instrument for the call with exogenous variation in borrowers' reachability. The effect of the call is also persistent. Borrowers, who receive a call, are significantly less likely to become delinquent again. Personal aspects of the call, such as the likeability of the agent's voice, significantly affect payment behavior, while the surprise element of the call does not. Our results suggest that the form of communication significantly affects borrowers' payment behavior.

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The effect of communication channels on dishonest behavior

Cited by 36 publications

References 28 publications

Lies in disguise – A theoretical analysis of cheating

Lies in disguise – A theoretical analysis of cheating

Digital Communication and Swift Trust

Personal Communication in a Fintech World: Evidence from Loan Payments

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