The effect of cognitive load on social categorization in the category confusion paradigm

Abstract

The category confusion paradigm (Taylor, Fiske, Etco & Ruderman, 1978) was used to examine the relationship between cognitive load and the extent of social categorization. The original prediction made by Taylor et al. (1978; Experiment 2) and inferences from the cognitive miser model suggest that categorization should increase or be unaected by cognitive load. In contrast, it is argued that social categorization can be an eortful and resource-consuming process, especially where the representation of multiple stimuli are concerned. This leads to the prediction that social categorization should decrease with loadÐassuming there is enough load to produce recall errors in the ®rst place. We obtained results consistent with this analysis in paradigms which manipulated load by means of set-size (Study 1) and processing pace (Study 2).

Social Welfare as Small‐Scale Help: Evolutionary Psychology and the Deservingness Heuristic

“…Sex is an extremely important evolutionary attribute, and organisms without cognitive mechanisms designed to identify what constitutes the pool of potential mating partners would not have done well over the course of evolution (Buss 2005). In line with this, previous studies using the WSW method demonstrate that categorization on the basis of sex is very strong (Kurzban, Tooby, and Cosmides 2001;Lieberman, Oum, and Kurzban 2008) and proceeds automatically (Spears et al 1999). In this way, it is expected that categorization on the basis of sex shares fundamental properties with categorization on the basis of cheater-relevant information in terms of evolutionary status and automaticity.…”

Preadolescents' categorization of gender and ethnicity at the subgroup level in memory

“…Furthermore, children and early adolescents may lack either the cognitive resources or the experience simultaneously to encode targets at two different hierarchical levels. Categorizing multiple targets seems to be an effortful process as cognitive load reduces adults' ability to categorize targets in statement matching paradigms (Nolan, Haslam, Spears, & Oakes, 1999; Spears, Haslam, & Jansen, 1999). The stimuli in these studies only varied along one dimension.…”

An examination of resource-based and fit-based theories of stereotyping under cognitive load and fit

“…Although the concurrent task manipulation of load has been most popular, cognitive load has also been operationalised in other ways. These include: (a) varying the number of target groups in the stimulus presentation (Stangor & Duan, 1991, Experiment 1), (b) varying the stimulus set size (Rothbart, Fulero, Jensen, Howard & Birrell, 1978;Slugoski, Sarson & Krank, 1991;Spears, Haslam & Jansen, 1999, Experiment 1), (c) altering the encoding environment by asking participants to read statements either aloud and/or repetitively (Srull, 1981;Srull, Lichtenstein & Rothbart, 1985) (d) increasing judgement complexity (Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987), (e) altering participants' mood state (Stroessner, Hamilton & Mackie, 1992) and ( f) decreasing the stimulus exposure time (Bargh & Thein, 1985;Pratto & Bargh, 1991;Spears et al, 1999, Experiment 2;Spears & van Knippenberg, unpublished manuscript). Many of these studies (Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987;Pratto & Bargh, 1991;Rothbart, Fulero, Jensen, Howard & Birrell, 1978;Stangor & Duan, 1991) have also reported increased stereotyping under load as found with concurrent task manipulations of load.…”

“…Participants were exposed to one of three levels of cognitive load (low, moderate or high) as an attempted re®nement of the standard two-condition paradigm (no load and load). This approach was used in the hope of more accurately creating sequential levels of load and of measuring stereotyping under a broader, more realistic spread of load intensities (as recommended by Spears & Haslam, 1997; see also Spears, unpublished manuscript;Spears & van Knippenberg, unpublished manuscript;Spears et al, 1999). Speci®cally, using three levels of load was expected to ensure that the supposed`(high) load' condition created more than just a moderate level of load (Bargh & Tota, 1988).…”