The Economic Implications of Restricting Spectrum Purchases in the Incentive Auctions

Shapiro, Robert J.; Holtz‐Eakin, Douglas; Bazelon, Coleman

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2541812

Cited by 8 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…Differences in the quality parameters a i are consistent with the U.S. wireless market as portrayed by Shapiro, et al (2013). In Table 1, we summarize evidence that is provided by Shapiro, et al (2013, Table 4), which shows that the largest wireless carriers in the United States use their spectrum more intensively than do certain smaller wireless carriers.…”

Section: Warehousingsupporting

confidence: 63%

An Oligopoly Model for Analyzing and Evaluating (Re)-Assignments of Spectrum Licenses

Loertscher

Marx

2014

Rev Ind Organ

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The Communications Act requires the Federal Communications Commission to assess whether proposed spectrum license transactions serve the public interest, convenience, and necessity. We review the FCC's implementation of this component of the Act. We provide a tractable economic model of competition among wireless service providers in which spectrum licenses are a costreducing input. This model allows us to evaluate the effects of (re-)assigning spectrum licenses on economic outcomes and to define operational measures of "warehousing" licenses. Calibrating the model, we find little evidence of warehousing and that the approved Verizon-T-Mobile-SpectrumCo transaction increased social surplus.

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Section: Warehousingsupporting

confidence: 63%

An Oligopoly Model for Analyzing and Evaluating (Re)-Assignments of Spectrum Licenses

Loertscher

Marx

2014

Rev Ind Organ

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“…Both parties determine the valuations of different allocations and the principal then sets allowances less or equal to these valuations, which describe how high the agent can bid in order to win a package. Shapiro et al (2013) argue that such pre-determined budgets have to do with capital rationing (Paik and Sen, 1995). For agents, these allowances are like sunk costs but they have preferences to win the most valuable packages within budget.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Truthfulness and Approximation with Value-Maximizing Bidders

Fadaei

Bichler

2016

Algorithmic Game Theory

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In markets such as digital advertising auctions, bidders want to maximize value rather than payoff. This is different to the utility functions typically assumed in auction theory and leads to different strategies and outcomes. We refer to bidders who maximize value as value bidders. While simple single-object auction formats are truthful, standard multi-object auction formats allow for manipulation. It is straightforward to show that there cannot be a truthful and revenue-maximizing deterministic auction mechanism with value bidders and general valuations. Approximation has been used as a means to achieve truthfulness, and we study which approximation ratios we can get from truthful approximation mechanisms. We show that the approximation ratio that can be achieved with a deterministic and truthful approximation mechanism with n bidders and m items cannot be higher than 1/n for general valuations. For randomized approximation mechanisms there is a framework with a ratio of O( √ m ǫ 3 ) with probability at least 1 − ǫ, for 0 < ǫ < 1. We provide better ratios for environments with restricted valuations.

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“…1 The electricity regulator in the United Kingdom believes the market in which distribution companies purchase electricity from generating companies has fallen prey to exactly this kind of "implicit collusion" (Office of Gas and Electricity Markets, 1999, pp. [173][174]. "Far from being the success story trumpeted around the world, the story of the U.K. generation market and the development of competition has been something of a disaster," reported Power U.K. (1999; see also 1 Since, with many units, the lowest winning bid in a uniform-price auction is typically not importantly different from the highest losing bid, this auction is analogous to an ascending auction (in which every winner pays the runner-up's willingness-to-pay).…”

Section: Collusionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Árverések – elmélettől a gyakorlatig: a 2020-as közgazdasági Nobel-emlékdíjról • Auctions – from Theory to Applications: On the 2020 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences

Eső¹,

Simonovits²

2021

Ma.Tud.

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uctions have become enormously popular in recent years. Governments are now especially keen, using auctions to sell mobile-phone licenses, operate decentralized electricity markets, privatize companies and for many other purposes. The growth of e-commerce has led to many business-tobusiness auctions for goods whose trade was previously negotiated bilaterally.Economists are proud of their role in pushing for auctions; for example, Coase (1959) was among the first to advocate auctioning the radio spectrum. But many auctions-including some designed with the help of leading academic economists-have worked very badly.For example, six European countries auctioned off spectrum licenses for "third-generation" mobile phones in 2000. In Germany and the United Kingdom, the spectrum sold for over 600 euros per person ($80 billion in all, or over 2 percent of GDP). But in Austria, the Netherlands, Italy and Switzerland, the revenues were just 100, 170, 240 and 20 euros per person, respectively. To be sure, investors became more skeptical about the underlying value of the spectrum during 2000 (and they are even more skeptical today). But this is just a fraction of the story. The Netherlands auction was sandwiched between the U.K. and German auctions, and analysts and government officials predicted revenues in excess of 400 euros per person from the Italian and Swiss auctions just a few days before they began (

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The Economic Implications of Restricting Spectrum Purchases in the Incentive Auctions

Cited by 8 publications

References 29 publications

An Oligopoly Model for Analyzing and Evaluating (Re)-Assignments of Spectrum Licenses

An Oligopoly Model for Analyzing and Evaluating (Re)-Assignments of Spectrum Licenses

Truthfulness and Approximation with Value-Maximizing Bidders

Árverések – elmélettől a gyakorlatig: a 2020-as közgazdasági Nobel-emlékdíjról • Auctions – from Theory to Applications: On the 2020 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences

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