The Dual-Use Education Gap: Awareness and Education of Life Science Researchers on Nonpathogen-Related Dual-Use Research

Vinke, Svenja; Rais, Irina; Millett, Piers

doi:10.1089/hs.2021.0177

Cited by 7 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…These frames tend to belong to different camps (particularly citizens, corporations, governments, nonprofits, and startups), with separate agendas and concerns, as opposed to characterizing aspects of a discussion that all actors should be having. There are signs this is changing towards more adaptive approaches to address the uncertainty surrounding the effects of novel technologies ( Millett et al, 2020 ; Mourby et al, 2022 ) in parts of the system, such as in innovation communities such as iGEM ( Millett et al, 2020 ; Kirksey, 2021 ; Millett and Alexanian, 2021 ; Vinke et al, 2022 ), or in entrepreneurial ecosystems ( Nylund et al, 2022 ). However, those are not characteristic of the governance system as a whole.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The whack-a-mole governance challenge for AI-enabled synthetic biology: literature review and emerging frameworks

Undheim

2024

Front. Bioeng. Biotechnol.

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AI-enabled synthetic biology has tremendous potential but also significantly increases biorisks and brings about a new set of dual use concerns. The picture is complicated given the vast innovations envisioned to emerge by combining emerging technologies, as AI-enabled synthetic biology potentially scales up bioengineering into industrial biomanufacturing. However, the literature review indicates that goals such as maintaining a reasonable scope for innovation, or more ambitiously to foster a huge bioeconomy do not necessarily contrast with biosafety, but need to go hand in hand. This paper presents a literature review of the issues and describes emerging frameworks for policy and practice that transverse the options of command-and-control, stewardship, bottom-up, and laissez-faire governance. How to achieve early warning systems that enable prevention and mitigation of future AI-enabled biohazards from the lab, from deliberate misuse, or from the public realm, will constantly need to evolve, and adaptive, interactive approaches should emerge. Although biorisk is subject to an established governance regime, and scientists generally adhere to biosafety protocols, even experimental, but legitimate use by scientists could lead to unexpected developments. Recent advances in chatbots enabled by generative AI have revived fears that advanced biological insight can more easily get into the hands of malignant individuals or organizations. Given these sets of issues, society needs to rethink how AI-enabled synthetic biology should be governed. The suggested way to visualize the challenge at hand is whack-a-mole governance, although the emerging solutions are perhaps not so different either.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The whack-a-mole governance challenge for AI-enabled synthetic biology: literature review and emerging frameworks

Undheim

2024

Front. Bioeng. Biotechnol.

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“…The iGEM audience not only spans a growing range of individuals from the high school level to working professionals but is also restricted in reach because attendees must be part of existing iGEM groups at institutions. Additionally, even among iGEM participants, a dual-use education gap was apparent [ 13 ]. Although these opportunities are invaluable experiences for students hoping to gain a deeper understand and perhaps become leaders in the field of biosecurity, many undergraduate and graduate students involved in bioscience and biotechnology research are distally situated and may never be adequately introduced to biosecurity topics at a level that will make a lasting impact.…”

Section: Education and Professional Programs In Biosecurity Are Lackingmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Need for Biosecurity Education in Biotechnology Curricula

Lee

Chen²,

Marwaha³

2023

BioDesign Res

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The growth of biotechnology in recent decades and the dual-use nature of most bioscience research are making their misuse, or accidental misuse or release, more likely and present as threats to biosecurity. A proactive approach is through educating the next generation of scientists to be more security conscious. However, current educational and professional programs in biosecurity are lacking. In this perspective, we recommend that biosecurity educational opportunities should be implemented and expanded for undergraduate and graduate students who will likely use one or more methods in the field of biotechnology. We then propose that biosecurity education is a key factor in a path toward sustainable and safe research. Finally, a set of 17 biosecurity competencies organized into 6 distinct themes is outlined.

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