The dolphin’s grammatical competency: Comments on Kako (1999)

Herman, Louis M.; Uyeyama, Robert K.

doi:10.3758/bf03199426

Cited by 31 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…We are therefore inclined to believe that it is arbitrary whether these tasks are called artificial grammar tasks or artificial orthographic regularity tasks. In this sense, the present research is quite different from research on language or communication in dolphins, parrots, chimpanzees, and other nonhuman animals, as well as in humans (Calvin & Bickerton, 2000;Candland, 1993;Catania, 1972Catania, , 1991Gardner, Gardner, & Van Cantfort, 1989;Herman, 1989;Herman & Uyeyama, 1999;Hirsh-Pasek & Golinkoff, 1996;Kako, 1999;Pepperberg, 1999aPepperberg, , 1999bPremack, 1986;Savage-Rumbaugh, Shanker, & Taylor, 1998;Terrace, 1985).…”

Section: Notementioning

confidence: 74%

“Artificial grammar learning” in pigeons: A preliminary analysis

Herbranson

Shimp

2003

Learning & Behavior

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Section: Notementioning

confidence: 74%

“Artificial grammar learning” in pigeons: A preliminary analysis

Herbranson

Shimp

2003

Learning & Behavior

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“…Both Pepperberg (1999) and Herman and Uyeyama (1999) appear to find this suggestion attractive. Pepperberg proposes that, because parrots live in complex social systems not unlike those of primates, their "cognitive abilities, whether or not syntactically expressed, should match those of nonhuman primates" (p. 17).…”

Section: Brains Social Complexity and Convergent Evolutionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…I encourage Pepperberg (1999) and Shanker et al (1999) to take the position advocated by Herman and Uyeyama (1999), who state that "the animal language work can help us to identify with more surety those processes in humans that may derive from general cognitive structures rather than from language-specific structures" (p. 22). By con-ducting crucial experiments informed by prior research on human language acquisition, we can learn more about the extent to which language is built upon other cognitive capacities and about the power of natural selection to produce similar capacities in differently organized brains.…”

Section: The Significance Of This Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In their thoughtful, stimulating commentaries, Pepperberg (1999), Herman and Uyeyama (1999), and Shanker, Savage-Rumbaugh, and Taylor (1999) have addressed a number of important issues. I will here focus on just three: closed-class items, the relations of brain structure and social complexity to linguistic capacity, and the importance of continued research on the linguistic capacities of nonhuman animals.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Response to Pepperberg; Herman and Uyeyama; and Shanker, Savage-Rumbaugh, and Taylor

Kako

1999

Animal Learning & Behavior

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Whether the animals studied by Pepperberg, Herman, and Savage-Rumbaugh can learn prepositions remains an open and important question, though the dolphins' use of demonstratives and conjuctions suggests an impressive competence for at least some closed-class items. It is unlikely that human-like brain structure can explain the capacities of these animals. Their capacities may instead be built upon the cognitive mechanisms favored by social complexity.In their thoughtful, stimulating commentaries, Pepperberg (1999), Herman and Uyeyama (1999), and Shanker, Savage-Rumbaugh, and Taylor (1999) have addressed a number of important issues. I will here focus on just three: closed-class items, the relations of brain structure and social complexity to linguistic capacity, and the importance of continued research on the linguistic capacities of nonhuman animals. Closed-Class ItemsI am pleased to hear that Pepperberg (1999) has proposed to teach Alex closed-class items, although I am disappointed that she has not yet done so. I disagree that Alex's success in learning in versus on (or above vs. below) would be trivial. Like Pepperberg, I strongly suspect that Alex possesses the necessary spatial concepts. The question is whether he can map those concepts onto lexical items and whether he can use those lexical items compositionally, in comprehension and production (to interpret a question like "What color hide in bowl?" or to respond to the question "Where yellow hide?" with "In bowl"). To date, Alex has succeeded in the mapping and compositional use of concepts related to object class, property, and number. It remains to be seen whether he can map and use the geometric and relational concepts relevant to prepositions.Herman and Uyeyama (1999) present persuasive evidence that the dolphins have learned two closed-class items-the demonstrative (pronoun) THAT and the conjunction AND. I am especially impressed by their capacity to use demonstratives in the comprehension of relational commands (e.g., THAT FETCH THAT). The dolphins' mastery of LEFT and RIGHT is very striking, as these terms encode abstract, egocentric reference points. However, they are not closed-class items, but rather belong to the open-class set of nouns (at least in English).' Whether Correspondence concerning this article should be sent to E. Kako,

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“…Ford,1989; (k) Sayigh et al, 1990;Ford, 1991;Barrett-Lennard, 2000. (Herman et al, , 1993Herman and Uyeyama, 1999;Pack and Herman, 2004;Tschudin et al, 2001); suggesting that they possess mechanisms for shared attention that need not be developed through formal training. They can interpret both static and dynamic gaze almost flawlessly, even in novel situations in the first set of trials (Herman, 2004), eliminating the possibility that they used an arbitrary stimulus response.…”

Section: Ecologymentioning

confidence: 99%

A functional paradigm for evaluating culture: An example with cetaceans

Greggor

2012

Current Zoology

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Nonhuman culture was first considered in nonhuman primates because they are genetically similar to humans. However, evolution is not progressive and therefore many species may occupy niches that favor socially transmitted, group specific behavior. Not surprisingly, evidence for culture has accrued in several taxonomic groups, including cetaceans. If culture is an adaptation, it is imperative we understand the factors that favor its formation. Understanding the evolutionary origin of culture will allow for a wider range of species to be studied, including those that are difficult to test in the laboratory. I propose a broad-based functional paradigm for evaluating nonhuman culture; based on the idea that while not all cultural behaviors may garner fitness benefits to the individual, the ecological and social environments in which cultural behaviors evolved must have favored the physical attributes and social learning capabilities that allow for cultural formation. Specifically this framework emphasizes the relationships between social learning, ecology, social systems, and biology in relation to culture. I illustrate the utility of the functional paradigm with evidence from the ceteacean group, while setting the stage for a stringent species by species analysis. By means of contextualizing culture, the Functional Paradigm can evaluate a species' potential to exhibit culture and can investigate potentially cultural behaviors [Current Zoology 58 (2): 271286, 2012].

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The dolphin’s grammatical competency: Comments on Kako (1999)

Cited by 31 publications

References 23 publications

“Artificial grammar learning” in pigeons: A preliminary analysis

“Artificial grammar learning” in pigeons: A preliminary analysis

Response to Pepperberg; Herman and Uyeyama; and Shanker, Savage-Rumbaugh, and Taylor

A functional paradigm for evaluating culture: An example with cetaceans

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