The Dilemma of Direct Democracy

Abstract

One of the oldest axioms about human decision-making is that knowledge is power. To be more specific, knowledge may enable people to make reasonedthat is, welfare improving-decisions. To determine whether this adage applies to voters with respect to ballot measures, we test four hypotheses. We find first that voters who know certain basic facts about an initiative vote similarly to voters who have knowledge of an information shortcut related to that initiative. We also show that many voters employ a "defensive no" strategy when faced with complex policy choices on the ballot. This reaction means that voters whose stated policy preferences would otherwise suggest they would favor the "no" position cast their ballots with less error than do people who favor the "yes" position. These hypotheses are well supported in the literature. Contrary to two of our hypotheses, however, we find no support for the expectation that better-informed voters, whether armed with certain factual knowledge or deploying well publicized voting cues, are more likely to make reasoned decisions than those who are, by our measure, uninformed. In other words, voters appear to make reasoned choices regardless of their ability to answer our knowledge questions or their knowledge of shortcuts regarding a ballot measure. We argue that existing theories of voting behavior may be inadequate for understanding voting on ballot measures and that more empirical research is therefore necessary. We conclude with some preliminary policy recommendations that could help improve the information environment for initiatives and referenda by providing key information on the ballot.

Has Direct Democracy Created Constitutional Dilettantes Out of Voters? A Reassessment of When Voters Use Cues in Initiative Elections

“…Whereas interest groups and elites will have an easier time establishing trust when an issue is ideological (and therefore the issue is easier for voters to understand), interest groups and elites will have a difficult time influencing voters when the issue is non-ideological. In fact, when we (Burnett, Garrett, and McCubbins 2010) analyzed Proposition 7 -a non-ideological issue on the same ballot -information did not have an effect on voters. Even for ideological voters, then, usage of cues is conditional.…”

“…Despite the dearth of empirical evidence, scholars have prematurely designated Lupia's findings the conventional wisdom in the study of direct democracy. Recent empirical work on the topic, however, has begun to challenge Lupia's results (Burnett, Garrett, and McCubbins 2010;Burnett and Parry 2012).…”

“…In a recent article, Burnett, Garrett, and McCubbins (2010) found no evidence that familiarity with the core facts behind a ballot measure or knowledge of the position of prominent cue-giver caused voters to vote differently compared to those who possessed neither kinds of information. This evidence stands in stark contrast to Lupia's (1994) and Karp's (1998) conclusion that voters routinely use information -including cues -to make decisions and raises two important questions: When and how often are voters informed about the policy choices they face on the ballot?…”

Information at the Margin: Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws, Ballot Issues, and Voter Knowledge

“…This new approach also speaks to a recent proposal by Burnett, Garrett, and McCubbins (2010), who argue for greater information about interest group po.sitions on initiatives being made available to voters in the ballot box, since voters need a "reminder to use their knowledge at the point when they vote" (317). Part ofthe information they wish to make available is the top contributors to initiative campaigns.…”

Sex and the ballot box: perception of ballot measures regarding same-sex marriage and abortion in California

“…By contrast, few studies (e.g. Lupia 1994; Bowler and Donovan 1998; Karp 1998; Burnett et al 2010; Burnett and McCubbins 2013) use individual-level data to consider whether voters who make these policy decisions are casting competent votes – a fundamental requisite for direct democracy to “work” (see also, Gerber and Lupia 1999). The question of whether individuals can cast competent votes on ballot measures is especially critical when a substantial amount of proposals aim to amend a state's constitution.…”