The Diffusion of Nonviolent Campaigns

Abstract

Existing research has uncovered strong geographical clustering in civil war and a variety of diffusion mechanisms through which violence in one country can increase the risk of outbreaks in other countries. Popular coverage of nonviolent protest often emphasizes regional waves like the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe and the Arab Spring. However, most research on nonviolence focuses only on features within countries affecting motivation and opportunities, and we know little about the possible role of diffusion and transnational factors. We detail how nonviolent campaigns in other states can increase nonviolent mobilization and direct action, highlighting important differences in the likely actors for violent and nonviolent direct action and the relevant diffusion mechanisms. We find strong empirical evidence for diffusion in nonviolent campaigns. The effects are largely confined to campaigns in neighboring countries, and there is little evidence of global diffusion. The potential diffusion effects are also specific to whether dissent is violent and nonviolent rather than general political instability. Moreover, we find that the effects of neighboring campaigns on nonviolent direct action apply only in cases with plausible motivation for contesting the government, and the effects are stronger when the regional environment can help expand opportunities for organizing dissent.

Does Immigration Induce Terrorism?

“…As stated above, immigrants are more likely to move to richer, more democratic states, which are less conflict-prone than poorer, non-democratic countries (Blomberg and Hess, 2008). Since people resort to terrorism when they perceive that they cannot change the status quo and achieve their political aims other than with terrorism (see, e.g., Gleditsch and Rivera, 2015), we do observe this conflict-decreasing impact of Migrant Inflows (ln). This means that while immigration weighted by terrorism in the country of origin is a vehicle transporting terrorism from one country to another, immigration as such may actually be associated with a normatively positive effect as well (e.g., Boubtane and Dumont, 2013;Dustmann and Frattini, 2014) as terrorist attacks do, in fact, decrease.…”

“…Hence, these individuals worked as brokers between their organization and the migrants, made use of their pre-existing social ties, and thereby recruited them for their activities. And, in fact, the policy diffusion literature on transfer across national borders consistently emphasizes that learning and emulation can occur under those circumstances (Simmons and Elkins, 2004;Elkins and Simmons, 2005;Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett, 2008;Plümper and Neumayer, 2010;Gilardi, 2010Gilardi, , 2012) -learning and emulation facilitate overcoming the collective action problem of mobilization (see e.g., Gleditsch and Rivera, 2015). Finally, an analysis of 212 perpetrators of terrorist acts by the Nixon Center (Leiken, 2004, p.43) further supports these patterns: "they are all associated exogenously to their role in the attacks.…”

“…Moreover, immigrants are usually drawn to richer countries that tend to be democratic, respect human rights more than poorer countries, are less corrupt, and are less conflict-prone than poorer countries, in general. Terrorism is a tactic used by people profoundly upset with the status quo who believe they cannot achieve their political aims any other way (see, e.g., Gleditsch and Rivera, 2015). Empirical evidence suggests that under some conditions, richer, more democratic states are more likely to produce fewer people inclined toward this type of behavior (see, e.g., Blomberg and Hess, 2008), and they also provide institutional mechanisms that make terrorist activities unnecessary.…”

“…Terrorism is frequently seen as the "weapon of the weak" and a product of poverty (see also Gleditsch and Rivera, 2015). Yet, there is only mixed evidence for a relationship between poverty, inequality, and terrorism (see, e.g., Krueger and Malečková, 2003;Burgoon, 2006;Piazza, 2011).…”

Authoritarian Institutions and State Repression

“…It is well established that violent threats to the state decrease the costs of government violence and thus repression is expected to be more likely under contexts of internal armed conflict (e.g., Poe and Tate 1994). In consequence, I incorporate a binary indicator for internal armed conflict, indicating whether a state experiences a civil war with at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a given year, according to the Uppsala/The Peace Research Institute Oslo Armed Conflict Dataset from N. Gleditsch et al (2002).…”