Authoritarian Institutions and State Repression

Abstract

Existing research has paid increasing attention to the role of political institutions such as legislatures and opposition parties in autocracies. So far, however, the relationship between nondemocratic institutions and state repression has remained largely unclear. This article argues that authoritarian institutions are related to divergent conflicting dynamics between incumbent regimes and opposition actors, which provide leaders with opposite incentives to repress. While authoritarian legislatures enhance leaders' capacity to prevent conflict and reduce their need for repression, the presence of opposition parties helps opposition actors to overcome collective action barriers and mobilize against the incumbent regime, increasing the states' need for repression. A panel data analysis of nondemocracies from 1976 to 2007 shows that authoritarian-elected legislatures reduce repression and the presence of opposition parties increases it. Moreover, the results indicate that autocracies with opposition parties and an elected legislature experience lower repression than autocracies with opposition parties but no elected legislature.

Taming a Paper Tiger? A Political Economy of Support for the Repression of the Business Elite

“…This literature zooms in on how the autocrat and his support coalition may resolve their credible commitment problem. For instance, institutions may serve several functions within this bargaining context, including nurturing loyalty among the winning coalition, credibly rewarding supporters through a share of power or rents, and constraining autocrat's repressive behavior, among others (Blaydes 2011;Lazarev 2005;Magaloni 2008;Myerson 2008;Reuter and Turovsky 2014;Rivera 2017). However, the ruling coalition can be sustained only under a binding balance of power, in which the support coalition can credibly threaten the ruler (Boix and Svolik 2013;Roessler and Ohls 2008;Sudduth 2017;Wright 2008;Guriev and Sonin 2009).…”

Dynamics of democracy aid allocation : from democratic donors to authoritarian regimes

“…Also, external support to political parties threatens multiparty regimes because it can embolden the opposition parties. Dissidents can more effectively challenge incumbents through a strong opposition party because it helps them to overcome a collective action problem (Rivera 2017). Opposition parties can gain popularity if there is external support for elections and political parties.…”