Dynamics of democracy aid allocation : from democratic donors to authoritarian regimes

Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze democracy aid allocation mechanisms between Western donors and authoritarian regimes in recipient countries. The theoretical mechanism explains how strategic choices of donors and recipient countries based on their interests affect the composition of democracy aid. As a part of democracy promotion policy, Western donors have increased democracy aid after the end of the Cold War. They provide various types of democracy aid targeting the advancement of democratic institutions, practices, and norms in authoritarian regimes. I classify democracy aid into two types: regime-compatible democracy aid and regime-incompatible democracy aid based on authoritarian regimes' preference regarding democracy aid. Then, I discuss that donors' strategic choice based on security and/or economic interests changes the shape of democracy aid patterns. The empirical findings from the analyses of U.S. democracy aid toincreased regime-compatible democracy aid to their client states. Moreover, authoritarian regimes secure more regimecompatible democracy aid using their leverage over the U.S., when they have a higher political instability. The findings suggest that the strategic choices of donors and recipient countries affect decisions on types of democracy aid and shape the democracy aid allocation patterns.