2018
DOI: 10.31235/osf.io/un782
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The Differential Effects of Economic Conditions and Racial Attitudes in the Election of Donald Trump

Abstract: Debates over the extent to which racial attitudes and economic distress explain voting behavior in the 2016 election have tended to be limited in scope, focusing on the extent to which each factor explains white voters' two-party vote choice. This limited scope obscures important ways in which these factors could have been related to voting behavior among other racial sub-groups of the electorate, as well as participation in the two-party contest in the first place. Using the vote-validated 2016 Cooperative Co… Show more

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Cited by 20 publications
(26 citation statements)
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References 19 publications
(22 reference statements)
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“…The most recent example of this policy conservatism-racial prejudice-partisanship connection is the election of Republican President Donald Trump and his administration. Research shows that whites more fearful of other races/ethnicities were 10 times more likely to vote for Trump (Green & McElwee, 2018). Whites reminded that they will eventually become a minority showed increased support for Trump's anti-immigrant policies (Major, Blodorn, & Major Blascovich, 2018).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The most recent example of this policy conservatism-racial prejudice-partisanship connection is the election of Republican President Donald Trump and his administration. Research shows that whites more fearful of other races/ethnicities were 10 times more likely to vote for Trump (Green & McElwee, 2018). Whites reminded that they will eventually become a minority showed increased support for Trump's anti-immigrant policies (Major, Blodorn, & Major Blascovich, 2018).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, research on the political causes and consequences of rising economic inequality is flourishing, with a fundamental question being whether economic inequality is associated with inequality in political representation(Bartels 2008; Erikson 2015; Laurison 2016). Representational inequality can in turn generate class differences in political behavior, including differences in the likelihood of participating at all in the electoral process or of resorting to protest(Solt 2008; Weaver and Lerman 2010;Hooker 2016; Evans & Tilley 2017;Green & McElwee 2019;Schäfer & Schwander 2019). Thus in this section we also discuss the behavioral consequences (e.g., voting or non-voting) of class differences in views about the political system.Martin Gilens(2012)provides the most thorough documentation to date of the relationship between income, policy preferences, and policy decisions, finding that actual policy supported by both Democrats and Republicans responds mainly to the preferences of affluent citizens in those instances in which preferences diverge by class.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The unidimensional politics of identity -whether racial, cultural, and/or geographical in origin -take center stage, despite the fact that both Hochschild's and Cramer's compelling ethnographic accounts are replete with evidence of the subjects' outrage and despair over the concentration of economic power and resources in the hands of economic and political elites. 8 See especiallyMorgan's (2018) re-analysis ofMutz's (2018) data,Morgan & Lee (2019), andGreen & McElwee (2019), who conclude that "both racial attitudes and economic conditions are significantly associated with voting behavior in 2016...[yet the] findings make clear the difficulty of directly...attributing Donald Trump's election to one as opposed to the other"(Green & McElwee 2019:360). For similar arguments in Europe, seeNaumann & Stoetzer…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…;Erikson 2015; Laurison 2016). Representational inequality can in turn generate class differences in political behavior, including differences in the likelihood of participating at all in the electoral process or of resorting to protest(Solt 2008; Weaver and Lerman 2010;Hooker 2016;Evans & Tilley 2017;Green & McElwee 2019;Schäfer & Schwander 2019). Thus in this section we also discuss the behavioral consequences (e.g., voting or non-voting) of class differences in views about the political system.Martin Gilens (2012) provides the most thorough documentation to date of the relationship between income, policy preferences, and policy decisions, finding that actual policy supported by both Democrats and Republicans responds mainly to the preferences of affluent citizens in those instances in which preferences diverge by class.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The debate over changes in partisan identification in the U.S. offers another instructive example: partisan polarization is increasingly construed as an in-group versus out-group identity dynamic(Iyengar et al 2019), whereas others have shown that opposition to all flavors of partisanship has grown and is rooted in a general distrust of politics(Klar et al 2018). 10 By contrast, an example of conservative party mobilization of non-college-educated white men and women would be Donald Trump's use of a distinct fusion of class, racial/ethnic, and gender/sexual interests and identities(Gest 2016;McCall & Orloff 2017;Green & McElwee 2019).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%