The different faces of power in European Union–Russia relations

Abstract

This article applies Barnett and Duvall’s taxonomy of power to European Union (EU)–Russia relations aiming to understand power in its complexity and without a priori theoretical assumptions. Four different types of power – compulsory, institutional, structural and productive – feature simultaneously. It is argued that non-compulsory forms of power are key to understanding the logic of competition in EU–Russia relations in the decade preceding the 2014 Ukraine crisis, despite receiving limited scholarly attention. First, a struggle over institutional power, the capacity to control the conditions of the other actor indirectly, appeared from rivalling integration projects and competing norm diffusion. Secondly, power relations were strongly characterised by constitutive forms of power – structural and productive – in particular the capacity to produce and recognise identities, such as Europeanness. In both fields, the EU held a hegemonic position, which Russia increasingly challenged. The geopolitical reading of the change in regime in Ukraine in 2014 prompted Moscow to a radical change of strategy, by shifting the emphasis in the confrontation to compulsory power. Attempts at direct control, from annexation to sanctions, now dominate relations. Where Russia seeks to prevent the Euro-Atlantic community from gaining effective control over Ukraine through destabilisation, this can be labelled ‘negative’ compulsory power.

Interactionist role theory meets ontological security studies: an exploration of synergies between socio-psychological approaches to the study of international relations

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