The Dictator's Dilemma at the Ballot Box

Abstract

Chapter 1. Introduction 3 1.1. Twin Puzzles of Autocratic Elections 3 1.2. Argument in Brief 6 1.3. Contributions 11 1.4. Research Design, Key Empirical Findings, and the Organization of the Book 24 Chapter 2. A Theory of Autocratic Elections 32 2.1. Introduction 32 2.2. Fundamental Problems of Autocratic Rule and the Roles of Elections in Dictatorships 34 2.3. The Electoral Dilemma in Dictatorships 36 2.4. The Game of Autocratic Elections: The Dictator, Ruling Elites, and the Opposition 40 2.5. The Dictator's Tools at the Ballot Box: Electoral Manipulation and Economic Maneuvering 47

Political Budgetary Cycles in Autocratic Redistribution

“…Geddes et al (2018) provide the first cross-national evidence of autocratic PBCs, showing that dictators increase total government expenditures in election years. Higashijima (2020) finds that the magnitude of PBC is greater in less fraudulent elections and in more competitive elections. He argues that electoral fraud is a riskier option than policy maneuvering, because the former prevents incumbent dictators from credibly signaling their popularity and detecting popular support for opposition parties.…”

“…First, little attention has been paid to shifts in budgetary composition according to the electoral calendar. Most previous research focuses on the electoral cycle in government deficits (Higashijima, 2020) or total government expenditures (Geddes et al, 2018). Yet voters tend to be more concerned about specific policy issues rather than a mere increase in overall government spending (Chang, 2008).…”

“…Dictators have other tools to facilitate electoral mobilization, such as repression and electoral fraud. Repression stabilizes autocracies because it decreases the risk of collective action by increasing the costs of mobilization for the opposition (Frantz & Kendall-Taylor, 2014), whereas blatant electoral fraud increases the likelihood of an overwhelming victory (Higashijima, 2020). However, electoral dominance gained through these methods does not credibly signal regime invincibility, or allow dictators to gauge the opposition’s popularity and their own mobilization capacity.…”

“…These illustrative cases suggest that political budgetary cycles (PBCs) may be present in autocracies as well as democracies. While the size and type of PBC have been subject to rigorous research in recent decades, scholars have only recently begun to study autocratic PBCs in a cross-national setting (Geddes et al, 2018; Higashijima, 2020). However, these studies do not sufficiently discuss how dictators strategically shift their policy priorities to maximize electoral support.…”

“…Redistributive policies are related to the delivery of direct cash benefits to citizens. Lastly, suppressing opposition and intimidating citizens in election years do not legitimize dictators’ electoral victories (Higashijima, 2020). Consequently, dictators are incentivized to spend more on redistribution to signal their competence to voters and to obtain large margins of victory.…”