While political budgetary cycles in democracies have been rigorously studied for the past several decades, surprisingly little is known about electorally motivated policy manipulation in authoritarian regimes. This study analyzes how dictators strategically change the priorities of autocratic policies to cultivate electoral dominance even when election results are predetermined. I argue that dictators spend more money on redistributive policies in election periods. Using budgetary spending data from 63 autocratic countries between 1972 and 2015, this paper presents cross-national evidence of the existence of an electoral cycle in autocratic redistribution. Analyzing Afrobarometer survey data from 18 African autocracies between 2008 and 2015, this study also finds that citizens’ evaluations of redistributive policy fluctuate according to the electoral calendar. These findings contribute to the literature on authoritarian politics by exploring macro- and micro-level mechanisms through which authoritarian rulers improvise policy manipulation to cultivate electoral dominance.

This study analyzes how political leaders’ material backgrounds affect redistributive policies in democracies. Building on political socialization theory, we argue that politicians with personal experience of economic hardship are more likely to have sympathetic attitudes toward redistribution than those without such experience, particularly where political constraints are weak. We posit that firsthand knowledge of economic hardship helps political leaders understand why the poor need government redistribution, and leads them to support more generous social welfare policies. Analyzing an original dataset of leaders’ material background in 74 democratic countries between 1980 and 2011, we find that leaders who experienced economic hardship in their youth increase social welfare spending during their tenure, particularly when political constraints are weak. Following prior studies on leaders’ personal experiences and policy outcomes, this study provides a new approach to redistribution and welfare policy.

While numerous studies have explored the foundations of autocratic stability by focusing on macroeconomic variables, the micro-foundations of autocratic support have largely been overlooked. Using Afrobarometer survey data from 22 African autocracies, I examine how dictators stabilize their rule even during economic recessions. I find that the provision of welfare benefits alleviates the adverse impact of negative economic perceptions on support for the dictator. Citizens are likely to continue supporting the dictator as long as the government keeps providing universal welfare benefits. The results remain robust to different model specifications that account for alternative explanations and validity concerns associated with autocratic survey data.

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