The Determinants of Direct Corporate Lobbying in the European Union

Abstract

Whereas research on corporate lobbying in the USA has produced a set of robust findings, less is known about the determinants of business political action in other policy arenas and beyond the nation-state. In particular, we do not know how well the standard profit-seeking model of firm political activity travels. The article examines this issue with an analysis of business lobbying in the EU that reflects tactical adaptation to lobbying at the supranational level. Using data on 2000 large companies, we show that a modified profit-seeking model of corporate political behaviour is generalizable to corporate lobbying in Brussels. By contrast, theories emphasizing nationally distinct types of interest intermediation find little support in the data.

The determinants of direct corporate lobbying in the EU: A multi-dimensional proxy of corporate lobbying

“…Bernhagen and Mitchell (2009) operationalise the European involvement in a sector as a relevant factor. The logic is straightforward: the more EU legislation is active in a sector, the more the firms in that sector will lobby.…”

“…H-e2: Ceteris paribus, large firms will be more likely to lobby directly H-c1: Ceteris paribus, large firms will be more likely to lobby both directly and collectively at industrial level These hypotheses have been operationalised and tested by many American scholars and most extensively in the European realm by Bernhagen and Mitchell (2009) with positive results without, however, addressing due attention to the measurement of the dependent variable. Indeed, as will be illustrated below, scholars have hitherto fallen short in considering a firm's preference for the level of action and in constructing a multi-dimensional proxy of direct lobbying.…”

“…That none of them has found any form of relevant correlation speaks volumes. Moreover, this hypothesis has also been operationalised and tested in the European context by Bernhagen and Mitchell (2009) with limited results. Therefore the remainder of this paper will operationalise the dependent variable, namely direct lobbying, in a novel way.…”

“…This 'belief' is either implicit or explicit (e.g. Coen, 2007;Coen and Richardson, 2009;Eising , 2007;Bernhagen and Mitchell, 2009) in a great amount of works on European corporate lobbying without any attempt to provide any proper theoretical basis 6 . This stream of thought contradicts the Olsonian tradition by presenting opposite assumptions: individual action is here a fortiori conceived as preferable provided that a firm may afford it.…”

“…This article goes further: it analyses the empirical database constructed by Bernhagen and Mitchell (2009), with a multi-dimensional proxy of corporate lobbying. Indeed, the main contribution of this study is in its analysis, namely the operationalisation of the dependent variable 'direct lobbying'.…”