The Demise of the Two Presidencies

Abstract

Presidential-congressional relations scholars have long debated whether the president is more successful on foreign policy than on domestic policy (Wildavsky, 1966). The debate has focused on differential success rates between foreign and domestic policy and whether the gap has narrowed over time. This focus, however, neglects an important dimension of Wildavsky's argument. Wildavsky also argued that presidents should dominate Congress in foreign policy. Hence, the thesis predicts high levels of success on foreign policy as well as differences between foreign and domestic policy. Looking at the trends in success on foreign and domestic votes, we observe that whereas the difference between foreign and domestic success rates shows up consistently for minority presidents, the absolute level of support on foreign and defense issues has declined since the second Reagan administration. Analysis of opposition party base behavior reveals that foreign policy voting has become considerably more partisan.

Hitching a ride: omnibus legislating in the U.S. Congress

“…This fig ure represents the second lowest such bicameral distance in the period from 1947 to 1996 (Binder 1999, 527). The 1949-50 chamber distance is also lower than the ideological distance figures for recent unified Congresses since the mid-1980s, in what has been called a period of increased party unity (Fleisher et al 2000). Moreover, none of the case evidence amassed for this chapter makes mention of bicameral rivalry as a reason for employ ing the omnibus budget bill.…”

“…In these times we expect the majority party to look for special legislative procedures for moving their agenda by an obstructive minority. Indeed, partisanship has increased markedly in the 1980s and 1990s (Fleisher, Bond, Krutz, and Hanna 2000;Rohde 1991), the same period of time in which omnibus use soared. Hence, unified minorities now march in lockstep to block majority party policy making.…”

International Conflicts and Decision Making on the Federal District Courts

“…Next, government officials develop policy responses to the national-security threat that often involve suppressing civil rights and liberties at home (e.g., Duggan, 2005;Heymann, 2002;Tushnet, 2003). Congress, in an effort both to avoid drawing the ire of a public that has rallied around the president and to present a united front (e.g., Schultz, 1998), recognizes the executive as the nation's voice in foreign affairs (e.g., Hinckley, 1994;Koh, 1996) by endorsing the president's crisis-related prerogatives (e.g., Edwards, 1976;Fleisher and Bond, 1988;Meernik, 1993;Peterson, 1994;Prins and Marshall, 2001;Wildavsky, 1966; but see Fleisher et al, 2000). Once these policies take effect, members of the public bring lawsuits challenging these governmental actions as unconstitutionally restricting their civil rights and liberties, ultimately giving the judicial branch final say on the matter (although Congress can have "last licks" by stripping federal courts of jurisdiction or overriding statutory decisions, while the president can indifferently enforce judicial decisions).…”

Legislative-executive Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy: Continuum of Consensus and Dissension in Strategic Political Decision Process from 1970 to 2010

“…109 Such findings reiterate the argument of Fleisher et al (2000) regarding decrease in presidential success on foreign and defense policy during the presence of divided government because of rising opposition voting in Congress. 110 Empirical evidence in this study corroborates this theoretical foundation.…”