The Demise of the Nomadic Contract: Arrangements and Rangelands under Pressure in the Far North of Cameroon
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Moritz, Mark; Scholte, Paul; Kari, Saïdou

doi:10.3167/082279402782311013

Cited by 24 publications

(30 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…The nomadic groups could enter into contracts with Kotoko nobles, who acted as overseers of the pasture. A particular office, called ngalway, was responsible for coordinating timing and access to pastures (Moritz et al 2002, Fokou 2008). This was meant to avoid conflicts between fishermen and pastoralists and to guarantee access for transhumant pastoralists to dry season floodplain reserves.…”

Section: Case Study One: Kafue Flats Zambiamentioning

confidence: 99%

How fit turns into misfit and back: Institutional Transformations of Pastoral Commons in African Floodplains

Haller¹,

Fokou²,

Mbeyale³

et al. 2013

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ABSTRACT. We enlarge the notion of institutional fit using theoretical approaches from New Institutionalism, including rational choice and strategic action, political ecology and constructivist approaches. These approaches are combined with ecological approaches (system and evolutionary ecology) focusing on feedback loops and change. We offer results drawn from a comparison of fit and misfit cases of institutional change in pastoral commons in four African floodplain contexts (Zambia, Cameroon, Tanzania (two cases). Cases of precolonial fit and misfit in the postcolonial past, as well as a case of institutional fit in the postcolonial phase, highlight important features, specifically, flexible institutions, leadership, and mutual economic benefit under specific relations of bargaining power of actors. We argue that only by combining otherwise conflicting approaches can we come to understand why institutional fit develops into misfit and back again.

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Section: Case Study One: Kafue Flats Zambiamentioning

confidence: 99%

How fit turns into misfit and back: Institutional Transformations of Pastoral Commons in African Floodplains

Haller¹,

Fokou²,

Mbeyale³

et al. 2013

E&S

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“…My colleagues and I have described the same system slightly differently and argued that mobile pastoralists had a "nomadic contract" with traditional authorities whereby open access to grazing resources and personal safety were protected by sedentary FulBe authorities in their territory, in exchange for tax and tributes (Moritz et al 2002). However, we argued that the nomadic contract was about guaranteeing open access for mobile pastoralists, not about excluding them.…”

Section: Misreading Pastoral Property Regimesmentioning

confidence: 90%

“…Previously, we wrote that pastoralists announce their presence in the territory by paying a visit to the traditional authorities (Moritz et al 2002). We now know that pastoralists simply set up camp wherever they want because the authorities will show up to collect the transhumance tax.…”

Section: Rent Seeking Is Not Governancementioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, we argued that the nomadic contract was about guaranteeing open access for mobile pastoralists, not about excluding them. We gave the example of how the traditional FulBe chief of Mindif argued for mobile pastoralists' open access to common-pool grazing resources in his territory against the wishes of the Mindif-Moulvoudaye AgroPastoral Development Project, which wanted to exclude nomads from the project's grazing blocks in the 1980s (Moritz et al 2002).…”

Section: Misreading Pastoral Property Regimesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…My colleagues and I have studied the pastoral system in that floodplain for the last 20 years. Whereas we initially developed an argument of nomadic contract (Moritz et al 2002), we further developed our ideas and showed that pastoralists are efficiently, equitably, and sustainably managing common-pool grazing resources in a situation of open access (Moritz et al 2013a(Moritz et al ,b, 2014a.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Misreading a pastoral property regime in the Logone floodplain, Cameroon

Moritz¹

2017

E&S

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ABSTRACT. This is a response to an article by Haller et al. (2013) in Ecology and Society titled "How fit turns into misfit and back: institutional transformations of pastoral commons in African floodplains." In this response, I argue that Haller et al.'s description of the pastoralists' management of common-pool grazing resources in the Logone floodplain of Cameroon is incorrect in a number of ways. I summarize the findings from our longitudinal and interdisciplinary study to show that current pastoralists' management of common-pool grazing resources in the floodplain is efficient, equitable, and sustainable. Specifically, ecological research contradicts Haller et al.'s proposition that resource degradation is due to overgrazing in a situation of open access. This is an important point to clarify because pastoralists are often wrongly accused of overgrazing the range.

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