Recently, it has been shown that group-living subordinate clownfish Amphiprion percula increase their growth rate after acquiring the dominant breeder male position in the group. Evidence was found for strategic growth adjustments of subordinate fishes depending on the threat of eviction, i.e. subordinates adjust their growth rates so they remain smaller than the dominant fish and thereby limit the threat of being expelled from the territory. However, it is impossible to exclude several alternative factors that potentially could have influenced the observed changes in growth, owing to the nature of that experiment (removing the second-ranking fish--the breeder male--caused the third-ranking fish to change sex to become breeder male and change rank). We studied strategic growth decisions in the group-living Lake Tanganyika cichlid Neolamprologus pulcher under controlled laboratory conditions with ad libitum food availability. First, we show that male breeders grow faster than subordinate male helpers of the same initial size and confirm that N. pulcher shows status-dependent growth. Second, we improved on the experimental design by not removing the dominant breeder male in the group; instead we replaced the breeder male with a new breeder male in a full factorial design and measured growth of the subordinate male helpers is a function of the size difference with the old and the new breeder male. As predicted, male helpers showed strategic growth adjustments, i.e. growing faster when the size difference with the breeder male is large. Strategic growth adjustments were less pronounced than status-dependent growth adjustments.

Daily torpor can provide significant energy savings, but in bats may reduce rates of fetal and juvenile development and spermatogenesis. We examined the use of torpor during the day by male and female big brown bats (Eptesicus fuscus) in the field during the female gestation, lactation, and postlactation periods. While both sexes used torpor, males used it significantly more often and used deeper torpor than did reproductive females, indicating that the costs of torpor are higher for reproductive females. We suggest that by using shallow torpor, females may gain some of the benefits of torpor while minimizing the fitness costs. The different patterns of torpor may be responsible for observed differences in day-roost location amongst males, reproductive females, and nonreproductive females. Males should choose roosts with lower ambient temperatures than do females in order to increase the energy savings of torpor. Males and nonreproductive females roosted away from the maternity colonies more often than did reproductive females. Within one maternity colony, males roosted in the west end of the colony, while females roosted in the east end. These patterns of roosting may be related to how the roost warms during the day.

Behaviour is typically regarded as among the most flexible of animal phenotypic traits. In particular, expression of cooperative behaviour is often assumed to be conditional upon the behaviours of others. This flexibility is a key component of many hypothesized mechanisms favouring the evolution of cooperative behaviour. However, evidence shows that cooperative behaviours are often less flexible than expected and that, in many species, individuals show consistent differences in the amount and type of cooperative and non-cooperative behaviours displayed. This phenomenon is known as 'animal personality' or a 'behavioural syndrome'. Animal personality is evolutionarily relevant, as it typically shows heritable variation and can entail fitness consequences, and hence, is subject to evolutionary change. Here, we review the empirical evidence for individual variation in cooperative behaviour across taxa, we examine the evolutionary processes that have been invoked to explain the existence of individual variation in cooperative behaviour and we discuss the consequences of consistent individual differences on the evolutionary stability of cooperation. We highlight that consistent individual variation in cooperativeness can both stabilize or disrupt cooperation in populations. We conclude that recognizing the existence of consistent individual differences in cooperativeness is essential for an understanding of the evolution and prevalence of cooperation.

How cooperation and altruism among non-relatives can persist in the face of cheating remains a key puzzle in evolutionary biology. Although mechanisms such as direct and indirect reciprocity and limited movement have been put forward to explain such cooperation, they cannot explain cooperation among unfamiliar, highly mobile individuals. Here we show that cooperation may be evolutionarily stable if decisions taken to cooperate and to change group membership are both dependent on anonymous social experience (generalized reciprocity). We find that a win-stay, lose-shift rule (where shifting is either moving away from the group or changing tactics within the group after receiving defection) evolves in evolutionary simulations when group leaving is moderately costly (i.e. the current payoff to being alone is low, but still higher than that in a mutually defecting group, and new groups are rarely encountered). This leads to the establishment of widespread cooperation in the population. If the costs of group leaving are reduced, a similar group-leaving rule evolves in association with cooperation in pairs and exploitation of larger anonymous groups. We emphasize that mechanisms of assortment within populations are often behavioural decisions and should not be considered independently of the evolution of cooperation.

The discussion about the impact of pastoralists on ecosystems has been profoundly shaped by Hardin's tragedy of the commons that held pastoralists responsible for overgrazing the range. Research has shown that grazing ecosystems are much more complex and dynamic than was previously assumed and that they can be managed adaptively as commons. However, proponents and critics of Hardin's thesis continue to argue that open access to common-pool resources inevitably leads to a tragedy of the commons. A longitudinal study that we conducted of pastoral mobility and primary production in the Logone floodplain in the Far North Region of Cameroon suggest that open access does not have to lead to a tragedy of the commons. We argue that this pastoral system is best conceptualized as an open system, in which a combination of individual decision-making and coordination of movements leads to an ideal-free type of distribution of mobile pastoralists. We explain how this selforganizing system of open access works and its implications for theories of management of common-pool resources and our understanding of pastoral systems.