Abstract:Locke considers miracles to be crucial in establishing the credibility and reasonableness of Christian faith and revelation. The performance of miracles, he argues, is vital in establishing the "credit of the proposer" who makes any claim to providing a divine revelation. He accords reason a pivotal role in distinguishing spurious from genuine claims to divine revelation, including miracles. According to Locke, genuine miracles contain the hallmark of the divine such that pretend revelations become intuitively… Show more
“…The standard reading of Locke's view of miracles is that he was a subjectivist. Ayers (1993), Nuovo (2002), Mooney and Imbrosciano (2005), Flew (2006), Weinberg (2020), Rockwood (2018, 2021) all defend such a position. A key piece of evidence each scholar points to is the definition Locke provides of miracles in the Discourse ,A Miracle then I take to be a sensible Operation, which, being above the comprehension of the Spectator, and in his Opinion contrary to the establish'd Course of Nature, is taken by him to be Divine.…”
Section: The Subjectivist Interpretationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It is very important that we do not interpret Locke as claiming here that the event actually in fact, goes beyond the ordinary course of nature. (Mooney & Imbrosciano, 2005, p. 157)…”
Section: The Subjectivist Interpretationmentioning
Locke's definition of miracles in “A Discourse of Miracles” is widely cited by scholars as evidence of his subjectivism on the matter. According to this interpretation, Locke held it to be sufficient that an event seems to be a violation of the laws of nature for it to count as a miracle. Nothing supernatural need actually occur. The principal aim of this article is to argue that Locke can and ought to be read as an objectivist about miracles. A subjectivist reading falls short in two crucial respects: It undermines the function of miracles as evidence for divine revelation, so central to his account, and is at odds with his consistent and explicitly objective use of the term, as an event that necessarily involves a violation of the laws of nature. Indeed, it is from their objective nature that Locke thinks miracles derive their evidential force. A key part of my argument lies in distinguishing between ontological and epistemological issues concerning miracles and demonstrating how this distinction is present throughout his work on the matter. Ultimately, I conclude that what is often interpreted as Locke's subjectivism about miracles is his privileging of these epistemic issues.
“…The standard reading of Locke's view of miracles is that he was a subjectivist. Ayers (1993), Nuovo (2002), Mooney and Imbrosciano (2005), Flew (2006), Weinberg (2020), Rockwood (2018, 2021) all defend such a position. A key piece of evidence each scholar points to is the definition Locke provides of miracles in the Discourse ,A Miracle then I take to be a sensible Operation, which, being above the comprehension of the Spectator, and in his Opinion contrary to the establish'd Course of Nature, is taken by him to be Divine.…”
Section: The Subjectivist Interpretationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It is very important that we do not interpret Locke as claiming here that the event actually in fact, goes beyond the ordinary course of nature. (Mooney & Imbrosciano, 2005, p. 157)…”
Section: The Subjectivist Interpretationmentioning
Locke's definition of miracles in “A Discourse of Miracles” is widely cited by scholars as evidence of his subjectivism on the matter. According to this interpretation, Locke held it to be sufficient that an event seems to be a violation of the laws of nature for it to count as a miracle. Nothing supernatural need actually occur. The principal aim of this article is to argue that Locke can and ought to be read as an objectivist about miracles. A subjectivist reading falls short in two crucial respects: It undermines the function of miracles as evidence for divine revelation, so central to his account, and is at odds with his consistent and explicitly objective use of the term, as an event that necessarily involves a violation of the laws of nature. Indeed, it is from their objective nature that Locke thinks miracles derive their evidential force. A key part of my argument lies in distinguishing between ontological and epistemological issues concerning miracles and demonstrating how this distinction is present throughout his work on the matter. Ultimately, I conclude that what is often interpreted as Locke's subjectivism about miracles is his privileging of these epistemic issues.
“…11 Some worry that Locke's greater-miracle criterion will open the door to being easily deceived. 12 In reply, Locke argues that God will guarantee that opposing arguments form miracles are not equally plausible: God can never be thought to suffer that a lie, set up in opposition to a truth coming from him, should be backed by a greater power than he will show for the confirmation and propagation of a doctrine he has revealed, to the end that it might be believed. (ibid., 260) Locke suggests that because God is good he would not allow the greater evidence to back up a false claim to revelation and so God, being more powerful than any other being, would provide greater evidence, by way of a greater miracle, for genuine revelation.…”
Section: Locke's Second Reply: Denying Miracle Arguments Are Equally ...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Indians say of their Brama (not to mention all the wild stories of the religions farther East), is so obscure, so manifestly fabulous, that no account can be made of it’ (‘Miracles’, 258). Mooney and Imbrosciano (2005, 164) describe Locke's dismissive attitude here as ‘colonialist arrogance’, arguing that any competing miracles are ‘conveniently dismissed a priori as inevitably inferior to Christianity’ 17 . But perhaps Locke's point is that Hindu scripture is not very good historical evidence, and so the historical evidence for the miracles of Christianity is better evidence than the (non-historical) descriptions of miracles in Hinduism.…”
Section: Locke's Second Reply: Denying Miracle Arguments Are Equally ...mentioning
Christian apologists argue that the testimony of the miracles of Jesus provide evidence for Christianity. Hume tries to undermine this argument by pointing out that miracles are said to occur in other religious traditions and so miracles do not give us reason to believe in Christianity over the alternatives. Thus, competing miracles act as an undercutting defeater for the argument from miracles for Christianity. Yet, before Hume, Locke responds to this kind of objection, and in this article I explain and defend his response. In short, Locke argues that God will ensure that there is more evidence for Christianity (if true) and this greater evidence is an undercutting defeater for Hume's competing miracles defeater (i.e. it is a defeater-defeater). If so, then, as Locke argues, competing miracles do not weaken the evidence from miracles for Christianity.
“…First, on his view, we cannot know for sure what the laws of nature are, and so the best we can do is identify miracles as those events which seem to us to violate the laws of nature ( Discourse of Miracles , 259; cf. Mooney and Imbrosciano , 159). Second, he sees miracles as serving an evidential role in justifying belief in revealed religion, and a miraculous event can serve as evidence only if someone notices that the event is a violation of the laws of nature (cf.…”
If the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary, then it appears that miracles are metaphysically impossible. Yet Locke accepts both essentialism, which takes the laws to be metaphysically necessary, and the possibility of miracles. I argue that the apparent conflict here can be resolved if the laws are by themselves insufficient for guaranteeing the outcome of a particular event. This suggests that, on Locke's view, the laws of nature entail how an object would behave absent divine intervention. While other views of laws also make miracles counterfactually dependent on God's will, I show how this view is consistent with the essentialist commitment to the view that the laws are metaphysically necessary. Further, I argue that Locke's view is a relatively attractive version of essentialism, in part, because it allows for the possibility of miracles.
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