Abstract:If the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary, then it appears that miracles are metaphysically impossible. Yet Locke accepts both essentialism, which takes the laws to be metaphysically necessary, and the possibility of miracles. I argue that the apparent conflict here can be resolved if the laws are by themselves insufficient for guaranteeing the outcome of a particular event. This suggests that, on Locke's view, the laws of nature entail how an object would behave absent divine intervention. While othe… Show more
“…The standard reading of Locke's view of miracles is that he was a subjectivist. Ayers (1993), Nuovo (2002), Mooney and Imbrosciano (2005), Flew (2006), Weinberg (2020), Rockwood (2018, 2021) all defend such a position. A key piece of evidence each scholar points to is the definition Locke provides of miracles in the Discourse ,A Miracle then I take to be a sensible Operation, which, being above the comprehension of the Spectator, and in his Opinion contrary to the establish'd Course of Nature, is taken by him to be Divine.…”
Section: The Subjectivist Interpretationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Nathan Rockwood observes that, on Ayers's interpretation of Locke, miracles are “extraordinary events” that “merely seem to violate the laws of nature, but they do not actually do so” (2018, p. 300). To speak of miracles in this way is to use the term in its subjective sense, Rockwood explains, as opposed to its objective sense, as “an event in which God actually violates the laws of nature” (p. 300).…”
Section: The Subjectivist Interpretationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Returning to the subjectivist interpretation, Rockwood states, “Ayers's claim is that miracles in the subjective sense occur, but no actual violation of the laws of nature ever occurs (i.e., there are no miracles in the objective sense)” (2018, p. 300). Alternatively, Rockwood proposes that a miracle may, after all, violate the laws of nature but that this need not be the case for an event to count as a miracle.…”
Section: The Subjectivist Interpretationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…. but a miracle in the subjective (but not objective) sense cannot provide good evidence for revelation” (Rockwood, 2018, p. 301). The “second problem is that there are a number of texts in which Locke asserts that God can and does violate the laws of nature.” I agree with Rockwood's formulation of the first problem but think the second can and should be taken further.…”
Section: Problems With the Subjectivist Interpretationmentioning
Locke's definition of miracles in “A Discourse of Miracles” is widely cited by scholars as evidence of his subjectivism on the matter. According to this interpretation, Locke held it to be sufficient that an event seems to be a violation of the laws of nature for it to count as a miracle. Nothing supernatural need actually occur. The principal aim of this article is to argue that Locke can and ought to be read as an objectivist about miracles. A subjectivist reading falls short in two crucial respects: It undermines the function of miracles as evidence for divine revelation, so central to his account, and is at odds with his consistent and explicitly objective use of the term, as an event that necessarily involves a violation of the laws of nature. Indeed, it is from their objective nature that Locke thinks miracles derive their evidential force. A key part of my argument lies in distinguishing between ontological and epistemological issues concerning miracles and demonstrating how this distinction is present throughout his work on the matter. Ultimately, I conclude that what is often interpreted as Locke's subjectivism about miracles is his privileging of these epistemic issues.
“…The standard reading of Locke's view of miracles is that he was a subjectivist. Ayers (1993), Nuovo (2002), Mooney and Imbrosciano (2005), Flew (2006), Weinberg (2020), Rockwood (2018, 2021) all defend such a position. A key piece of evidence each scholar points to is the definition Locke provides of miracles in the Discourse ,A Miracle then I take to be a sensible Operation, which, being above the comprehension of the Spectator, and in his Opinion contrary to the establish'd Course of Nature, is taken by him to be Divine.…”
Section: The Subjectivist Interpretationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Nathan Rockwood observes that, on Ayers's interpretation of Locke, miracles are “extraordinary events” that “merely seem to violate the laws of nature, but they do not actually do so” (2018, p. 300). To speak of miracles in this way is to use the term in its subjective sense, Rockwood explains, as opposed to its objective sense, as “an event in which God actually violates the laws of nature” (p. 300).…”
Section: The Subjectivist Interpretationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Returning to the subjectivist interpretation, Rockwood states, “Ayers's claim is that miracles in the subjective sense occur, but no actual violation of the laws of nature ever occurs (i.e., there are no miracles in the objective sense)” (2018, p. 300). Alternatively, Rockwood proposes that a miracle may, after all, violate the laws of nature but that this need not be the case for an event to count as a miracle.…”
Section: The Subjectivist Interpretationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…. but a miracle in the subjective (but not objective) sense cannot provide good evidence for revelation” (Rockwood, 2018, p. 301). The “second problem is that there are a number of texts in which Locke asserts that God can and does violate the laws of nature.” I agree with Rockwood's formulation of the first problem but think the second can and should be taken further.…”
Section: Problems With the Subjectivist Interpretationmentioning
Locke's definition of miracles in “A Discourse of Miracles” is widely cited by scholars as evidence of his subjectivism on the matter. According to this interpretation, Locke held it to be sufficient that an event seems to be a violation of the laws of nature for it to count as a miracle. Nothing supernatural need actually occur. The principal aim of this article is to argue that Locke can and ought to be read as an objectivist about miracles. A subjectivist reading falls short in two crucial respects: It undermines the function of miracles as evidence for divine revelation, so central to his account, and is at odds with his consistent and explicitly objective use of the term, as an event that necessarily involves a violation of the laws of nature. Indeed, it is from their objective nature that Locke thinks miracles derive their evidential force. A key part of my argument lies in distinguishing between ontological and epistemological issues concerning miracles and demonstrating how this distinction is present throughout his work on the matter. Ultimately, I conclude that what is often interpreted as Locke's subjectivism about miracles is his privileging of these epistemic issues.
“…He says, "it is impossible to imagine anything's being thought of in the divine intellect as good, or worthy of action or omission, prior to the decision of the divine will to make it so" (Meditations AT 7/CSM 2: 432/291). 7 I take this to be the standard Aristotelian-scholastic view as well as the view of Locke: the (real) essences of object determine what objects will do in various circumstances, or what the laws of nature are (seeRockwood 2018). The kind of view has been defended more recently byEllis (2001) and, from a theistic perspective, byAdams (2018).…”
This paper is on Descartes’ account of modality and, in particular, his account of the necessity of the laws of nature. He famously argues that the necessity of the “eternal truths” of logic and mathematics depends on God’s will. Here I suggest he has the same view about the necessity of the laws of nature. Further, I argue, this is a plausible theory of laws. For philosophers often talk about something being nomologically or physically necessary because of the laws of nature, but this necessity is thought to be metaphysically contingent. However, they struggle to explain how the laws could be genuinely necessary while being metaphysically contingent. The chief advantage of Descartes view, I argue, is that God’s will can plausibly explain both the necessity of the laws (because God made them necessary) and the contingency of the laws (because God could have done otherwise). So, Descartes’ theistic account of laws provides a plausible explanation, perhaps the best explanation, of the contingent-necessity of laws of nature.
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