The Criticism of the Anti-Physicalism Program in the Modern Philosophy of Mind

Antukh, Gennady G.

doi:10.17223/1998863x/52/1

Tomsk State University Journal of Philosophy, Sociology and Pol

2019

DOI: 10.17223/1998863x/52/1

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The Criticism of the Anti-Physicalism Program in the Modern Philosophy of Mind

Gennady G. Antukh¹

Abstract: Рассматривается проблема философских оснований теории сознания в контексте соотношения философии и науки. В кратком обзоре развития позитивистских взглядов раскрывается вопрос о практической пользе метафизики. Обсуждается специфика ортодоксальной доктрины О. Конта, верификационистской эпистемологии, принятой в логическом позитивизме, принципа фальсифицируемости К. Поппера в постпозитивизме. На основании представленных концепций формулируется общее правило демаркации научной и философской проблематики. Данное п… Show more

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Bolzano on sense and reference

Gabrusenko

2024

Semiotic studies

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In the present article author examines the concept of B. Bolzano's sign, its place in the “Theory of Science” and the philosophical premises that determine its specificity. The closest attention is paid to the concepts of “sign”, “sense” and “meaning”. The author provides a comparative analysis of the use of these concepts by B. Bolzano and G. Frege and demonstrates the fundamental difference between G. Frege's understanding of sense and meaning and B. Bolzano's ideas. The ontological premises are demonstrated that don’t allow to derive one conception from another. The author reviews the hypothesis of E. Casari that proposes an alternative way for comparing the conceptions of B. Bolzano and G. Frege. The author analyses the conceptual structure of the hypothesis, compares it with the conceptual structure of the “Theory of Science”, and demonstrates presuppositions introduced by E. Casari. It is concluded that these presuppositions are not typical for the work of B. Bolzano and are not compatible with the premises of the “Theory of Science”. The author shows that the statements of E. Casari’s hypothesis that coincide with G. Frege’s statements about meaning and significance are direct implications of the presuppositions introduced by E. Casari, and cannot be deduced from B. Bolzano’s conception without them.

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Bolzano on sense and reference

Gabrusenko

2024

Semiotic studies

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The Criticism of the Anti-Physicalism Program in the Modern Philosophy of Mind

Cited by 1 publication

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Bolzano on sense and reference

Bolzano on sense and reference

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