Bolzano on sense and reference

Abstract

In the present article author examines the concept of B. Bolzano's sign, its place in the “Theory of Science” and the philosophical premises that determine its specificity. The closest attention is paid to the concepts of “sign”, “sense” and “meaning”. The author provides a comparative analysis of the use of these concepts by B. Bolzano and G. Frege and demonstrates the fundamental difference between G. Frege's understanding of sense and meaning and B. Bolzano's ideas. The ontological premises are demonstrated that don’t allow to derive one conception from another. The author reviews the hypothesis of E. Casari that proposes an alternative way for comparing the conceptions of B. Bolzano and G. Frege. The author analyses the conceptual structure of the hypothesis, compares it with the conceptual structure of the “Theory of Science”, and demonstrates presuppositions introduced by E. Casari. It is concluded that these presuppositions are not typical for the work of B. Bolzano and are not compatible with the premises of the “Theory of Science”. The author shows that the statements of E. Casari’s hypothesis that coincide with G. Frege’s statements about meaning and significance are direct implications of the presuppositions introduced by E. Casari, and cannot be deduced from B. Bolzano’s conception without them.