2005
DOI: 10.2202/1565-3404.1105
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The Credibility Imperative: The Political Dynamics of Retaliation in the World Trade Organization's Dispute Resolution Mechanism

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Cited by 54 publications
(38 citation statements)
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“…On the one hand, some scholars appeal to the logic of hands tying and argue that tight rules that credibly impose costs elicit better compliance Jide Nzelibe argues in the context of WTO enforcement that the credible threat of inflicting serious political costs on a violating state through retaliation is a way to mobilize "powerful export groups in the scofflaw state against protectionist policies" (Nzelibe 2005). By contrast, some scholars argue that flexibility is the key to deeper cooperation (Rosendorff 2005).…”
Section: Trade Liberalizationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…On the one hand, some scholars appeal to the logic of hands tying and argue that tight rules that credibly impose costs elicit better compliance Jide Nzelibe argues in the context of WTO enforcement that the credible threat of inflicting serious political costs on a violating state through retaliation is a way to mobilize "powerful export groups in the scofflaw state against protectionist policies" (Nzelibe 2005). By contrast, some scholars argue that flexibility is the key to deeper cooperation (Rosendorff 2005).…”
Section: Trade Liberalizationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Just as we could eliminate the doctrine of consideration without losing "contract law's commitment to market-based notions of fairness," 55 we could eliminate a ban against coercive interrogation without losing the criminal justice system's commitment to avoiding unnecessary brutality. Here Waldron makes a typical philosopher's mistake by attempting to derive concrete 48 Gross, supra, at 1504.…”
Section: Symbolismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…54 Id., at 37. 55 Id., at 43. The consideration doctrine does not exist in Civil Code countries, which are just as committed to market principles as the U.S. or the UK.…”
Section: Symbolismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…If an independent judiciary is involved, we might (not must) gain advantage from the judgment of an institution somewhat insulated from ordinary politics. 55 These propositions go beyond public access claims. They also can support executive secrecy.…”
Section: B Comparative Constitutional Lawmentioning
confidence: 99%