The costs of being consequentialist: Social inference from instrumental harm and impartial beneficence

Abstract

Previous work has demonstrated that people are more likely to trust “deontological” agents who reject harming one person to save many others than “consequentialist” agents who endorse such instrumental harms, which could explain the higher prevalence of non- consequentialist moral intuitions. Yet consequentialism involves endorsing not just instrumental harm, but also impartial beneficence, treating the well-being of every individual as equally important. In four studies (total N = 2,086), we investigated preferences for consequentialist vs. non-consequentialist social partners endorsing instrumental harm or impartial beneficence and examined how such preferences varied across different types of social relationships. Our results demonstrate robust preferences for non-consequentialist over consequentialist agents in the domain of instrumental harm, and weaker – but still evident – preferences in the domain of impartial beneficence. In the domain of instrumental harm, non-consequentialist agents were consistently viewed as more moral and trustworthy, preferred for a range of social roles, and entrusted with more money in economic exchanges. In the domain of impartial beneficence, preferences for non-consequentialist agents were observed for close interpersonal relationships requiring direct interaction (friend, spouse) but not for more distant roles with little-to- no personal interaction (political leader). Collectively our findings demonstrate that preferences for non-consequentialist agents are sensitive to the different dimensions of consequentialist thinking and the relational context.

The effectiveness of moral messages on public health behavioral intentions during the COVID-19 pandemic

“…While theoretically based in previous work (e.g. Everett et al 2016Everett et al , 2018, our findings seem to be counterintuitive -at least to the participants in our study. When participants read the different moral framings of public health messages, the majority predicted that the utilitarian message would be most effective in convincing others to change their behavior.…”

“…To our knowledge, there is almost no work that directly investigates how these different moral justifications might influence intentions to act, and certainly not in the context of the current pandemic. Past work in our lab and others suggests that deontological appeals will be more effective than utilitarian appeals, as deontological agents are seen as more trustworthy than utilitarian agents (Bostyn & Roets, 2017, Everett, Pizarro & Crockett 2016Rom, Weiss & Conway 2017;Everett et al 2018;Rom & Conway 2018) and people are more likely to be influenced by and accept advice from people they trust (Koenig, Clément, & Harris, 2004;Sniezek & Van Swol, 2001;Van Swol, 2011). Other work on moral exemplars suggests that appeals based on virtue may also be effective in promoting individual prosocial behaviors (Han 1 One study found that the median reproductive index (R0) of the seasonal flu was 1.28 (Biggerstaff et al, 2014, BMC Infectious Diseases ), while estimates from China suggest that R0 for coronavirus is 2.2 (Li et al, 2020, The New England Journal of Medicine ).…”

“…Previous work suggests that the effectiveness of different moral justifications may depend on who communicates them. For example, people who follow utilitarian principles, spending their free time or extra money on needy strangers rather than their immediate family, are judged to be worse spouses but not worse political leaders (Everett et al 2018). Even if, as we predict, deontological or virtue-based messages will be more effective than utilitarian messages, it might be that this effect is attenuated or even reversed when it comes from a person in authority, who is supposed to act more impartially and make cost/benefit decisions for the greater good.…”

Veil-of-ignorance reasoning favors the greater good

“…Decisions that promote the greater good may involve emotionally aversive sacrifices and/or an unwillingness to allocate resources based on personal or group-based loyalties (12,28). Observers tend to be highly suspicious of people who make utilitarian decisions of this kind (29). How, then, can decision-makers whose genuine aim is to promote the greater good advance policies that are so readily perceived as anti-social or disloyal?…”

Shared Intentionality, joint commitment, and directed obligation

“…Research reveals that there are many factors that determine which obligations people choose to follow. For example, one's goals will influence what obligations seem important: Fairness might be more important for being identified as a good leader whereas being loyal might be more important for being identified as a good friend (Everett et al 2018). The social domain in question will also shape the obligations that seem important (Fiske 1992).…”