Shared Intentionality, joint commitment, and directed obligation

Gilbert, Margaret

doi:10.1017/s0140525x19002619

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 8 publications

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“…Second, the implication that sharing norms should follow preferentially sharing with collaborators might overstate a sense of fairness in the cooperative activity. Gilbert (2020) has explicitly clarified that her view does not entail any norms of fairness. Sharing occurs often, and individuals who share might be more approachable in the context of both chimpanzees ( Nishida et al, 1992 ) and human infants ( Geraci et al, 2022 ).…”

Section: Unsuitability Of “Shared Intentionality”mentioning

confidence: 99%

Zhuangzi and collaboration in animals: a critical conceptual analysis of shared intentionality

Papadopoulos

2023

Front. Psychol.

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Shared intentionality is a specific form of shared agency where a group can be understood to have an intention. It has been conjectured that humans are better equipped for collaboration than other animals because humans but not other great apes share intentions. However, exporting shared intentionality from a debate about the ontology of mental state attributions like intentions to groups does not seamlessly lend itself to evolutionary science. To explore and de-center the implicit assumptions of Western conceptions of cooperation, I look at Zhuangzi’s philosophy of (in)action. This philosophy treats the actions of individuals as always a form of co-action alongside other agencies to whom one must adapt. Thinking of collaboration as a product of skillful co-action, not shared intention, sidesteps asking about cooperation in “kinds” or levels. Instead, it directs attention to the know-how and behavioral flexibility needed to make our constant coordination adaptive.

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Section: Unsuitability Of “Shared Intentionality”mentioning

confidence: 99%

Zhuangzi and collaboration in animals: a critical conceptual analysis of shared intentionality

Papadopoulos

2023

Front. Psychol.

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What’s the Alternative?

Elster

2023

The Palgrave Handbook of Methodological Individualism

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Responses to Darwall, Watson, Arneson, and Helmreich

Gilbert

2023

Philos Phenomenol Research

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It is an honor and a privilege to have received the engaged comments of these distinguished philosophers on Rights and Demands. 1 I thank them for the time and thought they have put into them.Each commentator makes points I have not been able to address in the space available, and many of the points I do discuss deserve a longer treatment. I hope that, even so, these responsive notes will help further to clarify and defend the ideas expressed in the book.1 Gilbert (2018). Unless otherwise noted, all references in this response are to this book.2 Unless otherwise noted, my discussion concerns demand-rights against another person, rather than demand-rights against oneself.

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Shared Intentionality, joint commitment, and directed obligation

Cited by 3 publications

References 8 publications

Zhuangzi and collaboration in animals: a critical conceptual analysis of shared intentionality

Zhuangzi and collaboration in animals: a critical conceptual analysis of shared intentionality

What’s the Alternative?

Responses to Darwall, Watson, Arneson, and Helmreich

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