The Costs of Artillery: Eliminating Harassment and Interdiction Fire During the Vietnam War

Hawkins, John M.

doi:10.1353/jmh.2006.0068

Cited by 7 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…It is defined in US Marine Corps doctrine as a "warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy's cohesion... [to create a] rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope." 30 The "combined-arms" approach to warfare came of age in the First World War by the spring of 1918, after much trial and error by both sides in their efforts to break the deadlock on the Western Front. The Allies had begun to co-ordinate the activities of land and air assets, with massed tanks, artillery timetables and air support.…”

Section: Manoeuvre Warfarementioning

confidence: 99%

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Clear, hold, build : the evolution of counterinsurgency (COIN) for the British Army in Afghanistan, 2001-2014 / Lucas Colley.

2015

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The British Army has amassed a wealth of operational experience in two theatres of conflict in the last fourteen years. In many ways, the conflicts of Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted the strategic shortcomings of those in charge, and yet highlighted the enduring tactical excellence of those charged with fighting the battles. In terms of organisation and equipment, the British Army has modernised itself, and introduced new tactics, techniques and procedures to deal with the reality of the contemporary operating environment. This work seeks to track the British Army's developments in counterinsurgency doctrine and practice from the conflict in Afghanistan up to the end of its offensive operations in 2014, and also the ways in which its orientation towards conventional war-fighting and the "corporate philosophy" therein does not lend itself well to waging counterinsurgency successfully as a matter of routine. This work also seeks to highlight how the campaign in Afghanistan has been plagued by the lack of a coherent strategy, and the implications both for the campaign itself and for future military operations. p.2 / 76 A C K U Contents: Acknowledgements p.4 Research methodology and literature p.5 Appendix 1: Casualties by year p.6 Appendix 2: Map of Afghanistan p.7 Preface p.8 Chapters:1. Counterinsurgency fundamentals (p.12)2. Antecedents: the British way in warfare, the Manoeuvrist Approach and modern I am grateful to all the British officers and soldiers who contributed their own experiences of their deployments to Afghanistan, without whose insight this work would be significantly poorer. Many spoke to me personally about what they did and achieved on operations, but also helped to point me in the right direction with regard to sources. They wish to remain anonymous, but they know who they are.However I do wish to openly thank Dr Duncan Anderson MA MBE, Head of the Department for War Studies at Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, for giving me the time to interview him at the Academy. He has operational experience as a former Australian Army intelligence officer, and has accumulated over two years in Afghanistan as an embedded military historian. His extensive knowledge and experience of counterinsurgency and detailed inside view on the conduct of the campaign at the higher formation level has been most valuable in interpreting the strategic approach of UK forces in Afghanistan.

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Section: Manoeuvre Warfarementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Norton-Taylor, R., 'Afghanistan: soldiers' reports tell of undue optimism, chaos, and policy made on the hoof'. The Guardian,30 March 2011. Available online at: http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2009/mar/30/afghanistan-military-chaos-operation-snakebite [Accessed 19 July 2015.]…”

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Clear, hold, build : the evolution of counterinsurgency (COIN) for the British Army in Afghanistan, 2001-2014 / Lucas Colley.

2015

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No, Afghanistan Is Not Really Vietnam All Over Again

O'Connell¹

2020

Mod. Am. Hist.

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On February 29, 2020, the United States and the Afghan Taliban signed an agreement in Doha, Qatar, bringing the United States potentially closer to ending the war in Afghanistan than at any point in the conflict's eighteen-year history. After months of military escalations, negotiations, and recriminations, the United States agreed to a token withdrawal of several thousand forces by August 2020 and to remove all remaining forces by May 2021. The Afghan government had been cut out of the talks, but the United States also vowed to encourage it to release thousands of Taliban prisoners and to enter into its own negotiations with the Taliban in order to pave the way to a permanent ceasefire agreement. For its part, the Taliban agreed to negotiate with Kabul after the troop withdrawals began and to halt cooperation with Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups.

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Computing Counterinsurgency: The Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) and Databasing During the Vietnam War

Feichtinger

2022

IEEE Annals Hist. Comput.

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The Costs of Artillery: Eliminating Harassment and Interdiction Fire During the Vietnam War

Cited by 7 publications

References 7 publications

Clear, hold, build : the evolution of counterinsurgency (COIN) for the British Army in Afghanistan, 2001-2014 / Lucas Colley.

Clear, hold, build : the evolution of counterinsurgency (COIN) for the British Army in Afghanistan, 2001-2014 / Lucas Colley.

No, Afghanistan Is Not Really Vietnam All Over Again

Computing Counterinsurgency: The Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) and Databasing During the Vietnam War

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