Clear, hold, build : the evolution of counterinsurgency (COIN) for the British Army in Afghanistan, 2001-2014 / Lucas Colley.

Abstract

The British Army has amassed a wealth of operational experience in two theatres of conflict in the last fourteen years. In many ways, the conflicts of Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted the strategic shortcomings of those in charge, and yet highlighted the enduring tactical excellence of those charged with fighting the battles. In terms of organisation and equipment, the British Army has modernised itself, and introduced new tactics, techniques and procedures to deal with the reality of the contemporary operating environment. This work seeks to track the British Army's developments in counterinsurgency doctrine and practice from the conflict in Afghanistan up to the end of its offensive operations in 2014, and also the ways in which its orientation towards conventional war-fighting and the "corporate philosophy" therein does not lend itself well to waging counterinsurgency successfully as a matter of routine. This work also seeks to highlight how the campaign in Afghanistan has been plagued by the lack of a coherent strategy, and the implications both for the campaign itself and for future military operations. p.2 / 76 A C K U Contents: Acknowledgements p.4 Research methodology and literature p.5 Appendix 1: Casualties by year p.6 Appendix 2: Map of Afghanistan p.7 Preface p.8 Chapters:1. Counterinsurgency fundamentals (p.12)2. Antecedents: the British way in warfare, the Manoeuvrist Approach and modern I am grateful to all the British officers and soldiers who contributed their own experiences of their deployments to Afghanistan, without whose insight this work would be significantly poorer. Many spoke to me personally about what they did and achieved on operations, but also helped to point me in the right direction with regard to sources. They wish to remain anonymous, but they know who they are.However I do wish to openly thank Dr Duncan Anderson MA MBE, Head of the Department for War Studies at Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, for giving me the time to interview him at the Academy. He has operational experience as a former Australian Army intelligence officer, and has accumulated over two years in Afghanistan as an embedded military historian. His extensive knowledge and experience of counterinsurgency and detailed inside view on the conduct of the campaign at the higher formation level has been most valuable in interpreting the strategic approach of UK forces in Afghanistan.